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Abstract 
The dissertation represents a first randomized field experiment that compares action-
based and outcome-based payments for environmental services (PES). The main aim of 
the study was to investigate the effect of the outcome-based contracts in conservation 
auctions, and to prove the theoretical prediction on their improved environmental 
performance. In addition, the study uses a gender sensitive approach to examine 
gendered behavior. Tree planting contracts were allocated via conservation auctions in 
Central Kenya, one making final payments dependent on actions (keeping the soil 
around the trees moist) and the other on outcomes (tree survivals). The results show 
(i) a significant increase in women´s bids in the outcome-based versus action-based 
treatment, suggesting women to react more averse to the outcome-based approach 
than men. Also, (ii) women submitted significantly lower bids compared to men in the 
action-based treatment, wherein gendered differences in opportunity costs and cash 
constrains were identified as potential drivers. Further, (iii) there was no significant 
difference in budget effectiveness between the auctions for action- and outcome-based 
contracts. Moreover, (iv) tree survivals were statistically undistinguishable for the 
action-based and outcome-based treatments, whereas (v) the type of contract, 
however, played a role in defining care taking actions, with outcome-based contract 
holders being more likely to conduct conservation activities that are expected to 
improve tree survivals. Furthermore, (vi) women achieved significantly less surviving 
trees than men, wherein gender imbalance in mutual labor support in the contract 
implementation was identified as potential driver for the lower performance. In this 
respect, despite the decline in women’s tree survivals, the contract allocation to 
women was still highly cost-effective. In addition, (vii) tree survivals were increasing 
with the payment amount, implying that decreasing the gap between informational 
rents and true opportunity costs might negatively affect the environmental 
performance. Finally, (viii) the overall high tree survivals might be in the first place 
motivated by the payments and expected future tree benefits, wherein a number of 
factors also suggest on intrinsic motivation for tree survivals.   
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Zusammenfassung 
Die Dissertation präsentiert die erste randomisierte Feldstudie die handlungs- und 
ergebnisorientierte Zahlungen für Umweltleistungen (PES) vergleicht. Ziel dieser Studie ist 
es, den Effekt eines ergebnisorientierten Vertrages in Umweltauktionen zu untersuchen, 
sowie die theoretischen Voraussetzungen für deren erhöhte Umweltperformance zu 
prüfen. Des Weiteren untersucht die Studie das genderspezifische Verhalten. Verträge für 
Baumpflanzung wurden mittels Umweltauktionen in Zentralkenia verteilt, wobei der eine 
Vertrag für Handlungen (Erhalt der Bodenfeuchtigkeit) und der andere für Ergebnisse 
(Überlebensraten der Bäume) vergütete. Die Ergebnisse zeigen (i) einen signifikanten 
Anstieg in Geboten von Frauen in der ergebnisorientierten Auktion, welcher auf eine 
erhöhte Aversion der Frauen gegenüber dem ergebnisorientierten Ansatz hinweist. 
Darüber hinaus (ii) haben Frauen in der handlungsorientierten Auktion signifikant 
niedrigere Gebote abgegeben als Männer, wobei die genderspezifischen 
Opportunitätskosten sowie finanziellen Bedingungen mögliche Erklärungen darstellen. 
Ferner (iii) wurden keine signifikanten Differenzen in der Budget-Effektivität zwischen 
den Vertragsarten festgestellt. Außerdem (iv) waren die Überlebensraten der Bäume unter 
den handlungs- und ergebnisorientierten Verträgen nicht signifikant unterschiedlich, 
wobei (v) die Vertragsart eine Rolle in der Baumpflege spielte. Die Teilnehmer mit 
ergebnisorientierten Verträgen haben eher zusätzliche Aktivitäten zur Erhaltung der 
Bäume umgesetzt. Des Weiteren, (vi) haben Frauen signifikant weniger überlebende 
Bäume erzielt als Männer, wobei geschlechtsspezifisches Ungleichgewicht in der 
gegenseitigen Unterstützung bei der Vertragsimplementierung als Einflussfaktor für die 
niedrigere Performance identifiziert wurde. Trotz der Senkung der Überlebensraten, war 
die Vergabe der Verträge an Frauen immer noch sehr kosteneffizient. Außerdem (vii) sind 
die Überlebensraten der Bäume mit den Zahlungsbeträgen gestiegen, was darauf 
hindeutet, dass eine Reduzierung der Differenz zwischen den Opportunitätskosten und 
den Geboten negative Effekte auf die Umweltperformance auswirkt. Zuletzt, (viii) die 
generell hohe Überlebensraten der Bäume könnten durch die Zahlungen und zukünftige 
Leistungen der Bäume motiviert worden sein, wobei einige Faktoren auch für eine 
intrinsische Motivation für das Überleben der Bäume sprechen.  
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1. Introduction 
1.1. Motivation for the dissertation 
Concept of payments for environmental services 
Biodiversity and ecosystems provide environmental services of direct value to people 
such as food, clean water, and fuel, but also many indirect services including water 
filtration, climate regulation, flood protection, nutrient cycling and pollination. 
Environmental services are therefore extremely valuable in terms of economic, social 
and cultural aspects, and are being increasingly demanded due to rapid world 
population growth. However, a high degradation is changing the capability of 
ecosystems to meet these demands (OECD, 2010, 2013). 
From an economic perspective, the degradation of ecosystems results from the public 
good nature of environmental services. In this respect, market-based policy 
instruments have become increasingly applied to procure environmental services from 
private landholders in the last three decades, whereas payments for environmental 
services (PES) represent the most commonly used policy instrument (Engel et al., 
2008; Schilizzi et al., 2011; Swallow et al., 2009). The conservation payments convert 
external, non-market environmental values into financial incentives for the 
landholders (Engel et al., 2008). The rationale behind is to encourage people to 
voluntarily preserve ecosystems by compensating the opportunity costs of sustainable 
land-uses and the costs of actions required to provide environmental services (García-
Amado et al., 2011; Pagiola et al., 2005; Wunder, 2005; Wünscher et al., 2008). 
The direct nature of PES is argued to offer potentially large savings as well as to be 
more effective in delivering environmental goals than indirect or regulatory 
conservation approaches. Consequently, the research on how to advance the 
effectiveness gains of PES is of particular importance, whereas it is argued that the 
contract design, the contract allocation mechanism, targeting, and the acceptance of 
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PES program determine how effective the PES scheme is (Engel et al., 2008; Ferraro & 
Simpson, 2002; Schomers & Matzdorf, 2013; Wunder, 2005; Wunder et al. 2008) 
Outcome-based conservation contracts 
In the context of enhancing PES performance, linking payments to outcomes is argued 
to boost PES effectiveness. It remains, however, the norm to offer a uniform 
conservation payment for compliance with action prescriptions that are expected to 
deliver the desired outcome (Holm-Müller et al., 2006; Latacz-Lohmann & Schilizzi, 
2005; Schilizzi et al., 2011; Schwarz et al., 2008). I refer to these two approaches as to 
outcome-based and action-based conservation payments, respectively.1  
The outcome-based contract design gives landholders the flexibility in how to achieve 
the desired environmental outcome, it allows for an efficient use of their resources and 
knowledge, provides incentives for innovations, and is expected to increase intrinsic 
motivation. As result the environmental performance should increase and the private 
compliance costs decrease. Nevertheless, as outcome-based approaches impose the 
additional risk of not achieving the desired goals, it might induce participants to 
request risk premiums (Latacz-Lohmann & Schilizzi, 2005; Matzdorf, 2004; Matzdorf & 
Lorenz, 2010; Schilizzi et al., 2011; Schilizzi & Latacz-Lohmann, 2016; Schwarz et al., 
2008; Wätzold & Schwerdtner, 2005; Zabel & Roe, 2009). Figure 1 visualizes the 
predicted effects of the outcome-based payments on the environmental performance 
(denoted as dynamic cost-effectiveness), and on the willingness to accept (denoted as 
static cost-effectiveness). 
                                                        
1 Other terms used for action-based conservation payments: Input-based payments, payments prescribing 
specified activities, payments tied to actions. Other terms used for outcome-based conservation payments: Result-
oriented payments, performance-based payments, payments tied to outcomes. 
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Figure 1 The predicted effects of outcome-based payments  
 
Adapted from Matzdorf & Lorenz (2010) 
Conservation auctions 
One of the major challenges for the PES schemes refers to how to optimally select the 
contracts (Hajkowicz et al., 2007), wherein asymmetric information between 
landowners and the conservation agency can limit the effectiveness of PES programs 
(Ferraro, 2008). In this context, procurement auctions among suppliers of 
environmental services are argued to more truly reveal the opportunity costs, as the 
participants bid competitively for a limited number of conservation contracts. The 
bidders thus face a trade-off between a higher informational rent and a reduced chance 
of winning, which decreases the incentive to inflate their willingness to accept. 
Consequently, the cost revelation property of conservation auctions is expected to 
provide budget effectiveness gains (Engel & Palmer 2008; Ferraro, 2008; Latacz-
Lohmann & Schilizzi, 2005; Latacz-Lohmann & Van der Hamsvoort, 1997), and 
auctions are thus gaining increasing interest as alternative to the flat-rate payments 
(Burton & Schwarz, 2013; Schwarz et al., 2008).  
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Moreover, risk aversion - as compared to risk neutrality - is predicted to decrease the 
willingness to accept in auctions. The rationale behind is that if the income from the 
conservation contract reduces landholders´ income uncertainty, risk averse bidders 
lower their bids in order to increase the probability of being awarded the conservation 
payment (Jack, 2010; Latacz-Lohmann & Van der Hamsvoort, 1997).  
At the same time, it is also claimed that a trade-off exists between payment savings and 
environmental performance. According to Latacz-Lohmann & Schilizzi (2005, p.39) 
“extracting a higher share of information rents from bidders, by itself, achieves little in 
promoting efficient use of resources”; while Jack (2010, p.27) states that “the 
compliance is increasing in the difference between the price and minimum willingness 
to accept.” Payment surplus thus might increase the contract compliance. 
Tendering outcome-based contracts 
The above argumentation suggests that allocating outcome-based contracts via an 
auction has the potential to further improve PES effectiveness. However, theoretical 
predictions on linking the two – the result-oriented approach and the tender – are far 
from clear. Specifically, while auctions are expected to decrease the informational 
rents, linking payments to outcomes might result into risk premiums. Hence, the 
potential effectiveness gains of tendering outcome-based payments depend on 
whether the incentive effect - related to improved environmental performance - 
outweighs the risk effect (Schilizzi et al., 2011; Schilizzi & Latacz-Lohmann, 2016). 
Gender aspects 
PES schemes have been increasingly implemented in developing countries that 
represent important suppliers of environmental services (Jindal et al., 2013; Kerr et al., 
2012; Swallow et al., 2009; Wunder et al., 2008). In this context, gender related 
inequalities are generally prevalent in the developing world (Colfer et al., 2013; FAO, 
2011; GEF, 2013), wherein women’s rights to land are often secured through their ties 
to husbands, women face difficulties in accessing financial credits, appropriate 
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technology and extension service, and are more labor constrained (Kiptot & Franzel, 
2011; Kiptot et al., 2014). Thus, despite of women being key actors in African 
agriculture they have limited access to resources, whereas it is argued that eliminating 
the gender imbalance would lead to higher agricultural productivity (FAO, 2011; 
Murage et al., 2015). There is, however, only little evidence on gender with respect to 
conservation (Colfer et al., 2013; Villamor et al., 2013), wherein it is argued that 
addressing the gender gap also holds potential for improved provision of 
environmental services (Kiptot et al., 2014). In the context of PES, we argue that 
traditional gender roles might imply gendered differences in willingness to accept and 
in environmental performance, and moreover, we suppose that men and women might 
react differently to the incentives given by the action- and outcome-based approaches. 
1.2. Previous studies 
A theoretical model on applying auctions to conservation contracts has been developed 
(Latacz-Lohmann & Van der Hamsvoort, 1997) and different auction designs tested in 
laboratory experiments (Cason et al., 2003; Cummings et al., 2002; Hailu & Schilizzi, 
2004). Conservation auctions have been implemented in the US (Baylis et al., 2008; 
Connor et al., 2008) and Australia (Rolfe & Windle, 2011; Stoneham et al., 2003; Windle 
& Rolfe, 2008) and tested in Germany (Bertke et al., 2008; Groth, 2005, 2008), while 
field trials in Indonesia and Malawi contributed to the little empirical evidence on the 
performance of tendering in developing countries (Ajayi et al., 2012; Jack, 2010, 2013; 
Jack et al. 2009).  
Further, while the experience in the US and Australia highlights the drawbacks of 
paying landholders on actions, there is only limited empirical evidence on the 
performance of outcome-based contracts (Schilizzi & Latacz-Lohmann, 2016). An 
overview of such programs in Europe (Burton & Schwarz, 2013; Schwarz et al., 2008) 
reveals that few schemes have been purely outcome-based, with most combining 
action-based and outcome-based contract features. In this regard, Zabel and Holm-
Müller (2008) have reviewed a truly outcome-based scheme for conserving carnivores 
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in Sweden, showing that compared to the traditional ex-post damage compensations 
the result-oriented payments were successful in addressing the moral hazard problem 
and removing the high transaction costs to the landholders. Further, de Saint Marie 
(2014) discusses the use of an outcome-based approach to the delivery of species-rich 
grasslands in France, concluding that the approach would allow farmers to adapt their 
management practices according to the plot vegetation and changing conditions, while 
it would challenge the conventional principal of agro-environmental policies on costs 
compensation. 
The combination of auctions and outcome-based contracting has been only recently 
initiated. A pilot project in Germany has examined two outcome-based conservation 
auctions, but the database was not sufficient to make a conclusive statement as to 
whether auctioning result-oriented contracts induced more efficiency gains than a 
fixed price scheme (Bertke et al., 2008; Groth, 2005, 2008). Tendering outcome-based 
contracts for ground-nesting birds in Australia (Goddard et al., 2008; Whitten et al., 
2008) reveals cost savings of around 30 percent, as compared to tendering of ex ante 
action-based payments. Yet, also in this case the analysis is limited by a small sample. 
Further, a forest enrichment field trial in Kenya has shown the auction mechanism to 
reduce provision costs, and the outcome-based payments to provide additional 
incentives to improve the environmental service provision, however, again the small 
number of contracts did not allow for statistical tests (Khalumba et al., 2014). On the 
contrary, robust results of laboratory experiments conducted in Australia and 
Germany (Schilizzi et al., 2011; Schilizzi & Latacz-Lohmann, 2016) show that 
combining auctions with outcome-based payments can be counterproductive in terms 
of the environmental output.  
The few studies on gender in conservation show ambivalent results, wherein on one 
hand, mixed-gender decision-making is shown to possibly improve environmental 
outcomes and food security (Villamor et al., 2014b) and to result in maintenance of 
protection forests together with agroforestry systems (Villamor et al., 2017), while on 
the other hand, women react more positively than men to logging or oil palm 
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conversion (Villamor et al., 2014a).  
1.3. Research gaps, objectives, and outline of the dissertation  
Research gaps 
While both the auction allocation and linking conservation payments to outcomes have 
potential to improve PES effectiveness, there are only few studies examining the 
combined effect of tendering outcome-based contracts. Similarly, whereas the 
conservation community is increasingly acknowledging the importance of gender 
aspects, empirical results on gendered impacts in conservation, and PES schemes in 
particular, are relatively scarce. I have attempted to fill the research gaps by carrying 
out a field experiment in Kenya. To my knowledge, this PES study is the first one to 
compare auctions for action- and outcome-based contracts in a randomized field trial 
setting, and is also novel in that it applies a gender-sensitive approach that allows for 
assessment of gendered behavior.  
Objectives 
The objective of the dissertation is to examine following hypotheses: 
1. Tendering outcome-based contracts results in risk premiums and thus higher bid 
values (risk effect), compared to the action-based treatment; wherein 
2. Auction for action-based contracts results into higher budgetary effectiveness. 
3. Outcome-based contracts, compared to action-based contracts, achieve better 
environmental performance; wherein  
4. Outcome-based approach incentivizes a choice of tree care actions expected to 
lead to the desired outcome (incentive effect), and enhances intrinsic motivation. 
5. Participant´s gender impacts PES schemes in terms of willingness to accept and 
environmental performance; wherein 
6. There is a relationship between gender impacts on PES and gender roles and 
attitudes. 
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Outline 
The dissertation is organized as a monograph. After the Introduction chapter (1) the 
Methodology chapter (2) follows, describing the study area and experimental design. 
Chapter 3 represents results of conservation auctions (hypotheses 1 & 2). Chapter 4 
assesses the environmental performance (hypotheses 3 & 4). Gender impacts on PES 
and the relationship to gender roles and attitudes (hypotheses 5 & 6) are explored in 
Chapter 5. Conclusion (6) summarizes key findings and contribution of the study and 
outlines policy recommendations. 
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2. Methodology 
2.1. Study area and sample 
Study area 
I conducted the study in the Upper Tana River watershed along the Kapingazi River 
catchment, on the South Eastern slope of Mount Kenya. Here intensive agricultural land 
use and deforestation result in severe soil erosion and siltation of streams, 
representing major threat for hydropower and irrigation use downstream the Tana 
River, the Kenya´s largest river of crucial economic importance. An increased 
population with decreasing land sizes, lack of firewood and alternative energy sources 
resulted in deforestation and high pressure on riparian lands, wetlands and forests. 
Consequently, tree cover is low in the farming zones of the Kapingazi catchment, 
wherein there is high potential for conservation payments to reverse the degradation 
(Balana et al., 2011; Hoang et al., 2014; PRESA, 2010). 
Figure 2 Study area 
 
Source: Firmian et al., 2011 
The Kapingazi catchment´s total area is 62 km2 and it is located in the Embu County, 
formerly the Eastern Kenya Province. The Kapingazi River begins at the Mt. Kenya 
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forest boundary at approximately 2,000 meters above the sea level (m.a.s.l.) and joins 
the larger Rupingazi River 750 meters lower near the Embu Town (Mbugua, 2009). 
Accordingly, the cropping patterns in the Kapingazi watershed vary along the 
elevation, with a tea zone in the upper part, a transition zone with mixed tea and coffee 
plantation in the middle part, and a coffee zone in the upper lower part of the 
catchment. Subsistence farming – mostly maize and beans - is performed in the entire 
catchment and prevails in the lowest parts. Land scarcity results in zero grazing being 
the main livestock practice in all zones (Balana et al., 2011; Mbugua, 2009; PRESA 
2010).  
Figure 3 Predominant land-use classes in the Kapingazi River catchment  
 
Source: Firmian et al., 2011. The figure was adapted from original map by Miika Mäkelä (ICRAF), and data 
corresponds to year 2005. 
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Study sample  
Three administration units - called Focal Development Areas (FDA) - of the lower and 
middle parts of the Kapingazi River catchment, namely Muthatari, Mutunduri and 
Kairuri, were targeted for this study. The study sites were selected according to their 
contribution to the environmental degradation of the Kapingazi River, wherein in the 
targeted subsistence and coffee zones the silt contribution is greatly above the silt 
levels of the upper tea zone (Figure 4).  
Figure 4 Silt distribution by sources of silt and zones in the Upper Tana 
catchment 
 
Source: UTaNRMP/IFAD, 2012b. Notes: In the Kapingazi catchment the coffee zone stretches from the middle 
up to the upper lower parts of the catchment. Arid and semi-arid lands (ASAL) that qualified as the highest silt 
contributors are not represented in the Kapingazi catchment.  
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Kairuri represents the central part of the Kapingazi watershed where both tea and 
coffee were prevailing. It is located between 1,700 and 1,500 m.a.s.l., and with an area 
of 7.7 km2 it is the smallest FDA of the catchment. Kairuri is followed by Mutunduri, 
which represents the upper lower part of the catchment and is dominated by coffee. 
Finally, Muthatari is the lowest and greatest community area. It accounts for 
approximately 20 percent of the Kapingazi catchment and the altitude falls up to 1,200 
m.a.s.l. Here subsistence farming is dominant, with only few landholders growing 
coffee (Firmian et al., 2011; PRESA, 2010).  
All households at both right and left riverbanks of the Kapingazi River, in the 
demarcated research sites (Figure 5), were targeted for the study. In total 427 
households received invitation to participate in our study, out of which 411 provided 
data for an extensive baseline survey. Aiming at a gender-balanced study, a random 
draw was used to determine whether a male or female household representative is to 
be approached. Subsequently, 190 men and 237 women represented the targeted 
suppliers of environmental services. The prevalence of women is to be explained by the 
fact that about 20 percent of the households lack a male representative, making a 
random draw impossible. 
2.2. Experimental design 
Contract design 
As the baseline survey showed that over half of the targeted population was fully using 
their riparian area for food crop production, I abandoned the initial idea of the contract 
requesting the removal of agricultural production from the riverbanks. In the first 
place, I had food security concerns since there is the possibility that farmers 
underestimate their opportunity costs. Second, there were also budget reasons, when 
the request of setting land aside would greatly increase the contract prices.  
Consequently, the conservation contracts requested to plant 30 indigenous trees on the 
riparian area, without any further limitations on the land use. The riparian area was 
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defined according to Kenya´s law on the riverbanks protection, which determines 30 
meters from the middle of the river as riparian land.2 Further, as the measurability of 
the watershed services outcomes might be problematic, in particular with respect to 
the short contract period and the activities of non-participants, tree survival was used 
as measurement of the environmental performance. The contract period represented 
six months, which were crucial for the up-take and survival of the tree seedlings, 
particularly when the seedlings were distributed in the dry season (December).  
Figure 5 Study sites of the Kapingazi River catchment 
 
Adapted from: Mbugua, 2009 
                                                        
2 Environmental Management and Coordination, (Water Quality) Regulations 2006. Legal notice No. 120, Legislative 
supplement No. 36, September 29, 2006. Republic of Kenya. 
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Contract types  
In the action-based contract the payments were conditional on finding the soil around 
the trees to have sufficient levels of soil moisture at the time of monitoring. Under the 
outcome-based contracts the payments depended on the tree survival after the six-
month period, independently of the actions taken. Consequently, despite the 
differences in the incentives given under the action- and outcome-based contracts, in 
both treatments the compliance costs consisted mainly of opportunity costs of labor. 
Further, the contracts exempted flooding and other natural disasters from landholders´ 
liability. It was not only impossible for landholders to prevent flash floods during the 
rainy season, but also the aim was to explore the impact of risk due to farmers´ full 
responsibility for the outcome, and not due to the exposure to extreme events. 
Damages resulting from human adverse interventions, on the other hand, were not a 
priori excluded from landholders´ liability, as these might be prevented by 
watchfulness (Jack, 2010). 
Under the action-based contracts the landholders might be monitored several times, 
with the exact frequency and time of monitoring not being revealed. This prevented 
the landholders from deliberately watering the trees only on the days of monitoring, 
and from stopping watering after the last announced monitoring. Payments were 
reduced by one percent for each tree that was not kept moist. Thus, three monitoring 
rounds could have reduced the payment by a maximum of 90 percent. On the contrary, 
under the outcome-based contracts the payments reduced by four percent for each 
non-surviving tree. Up to four deceased trees were then tolerated without sanctions, a 
number agreed upon by landholders and experts to decease even if good care was 
taken. Further, regardless of the monitoring results and the contract type, all farmers 
were guaranteed 10 percent of their bids as a base payment, which was paid at the 
beginning of the contract period. Consequently, the maximum sanctions for both 
treatments corresponded to 90 percent of the contract payments. 
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Conservation auctions  
The auctions took place on December 14, 2011. In total, 234 landholders (112 men and 
122 women) participated in the conservation auctions, representing 55 percent of the 
targeted population. The participants were 
stratified upon income level and gender, 
and from each stratum the farmers were 
randomly assigned to one of the two 
treatments - either the auction for action- 
or outcome-based contracts.3 
In order to avoid information spillovers 
both auctions were conducted 
simultaneously, in separate rooms. In the 
auctions the landholders submitted price 
offers – bids - at which they were willing to 
accept the PES contract. A discriminative 
price rule was used in both auctions, paying selected bidders the exact amount of their 
bid. The auction was announced as one-shot budget constrained while the information 
on budget was hidden.  
Communication was not allowed during the auction, wherein the participants were 
encouraged to write their bid in a way that the figure is not seen, and subsequently 
place the bid sheet in the obtained envelope. It is, however, possible that the 
participants did occasionally see the bid values of the neighbors, as it was the case in 
the auction study in Malawi (Jack, 2010), with bids of nearest neighbors being 
marginally correlated. Further, the facilitators helped farmers who needed assistance 
in writing. 
                                                        
3  The income level was divided into low and high based on the baseline survey. 
Notes: Auction participants draw lots for the treatment 
assignment. Photo taken by ICRAF. 
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The total budget for both auctions was approximately 1,770,000 KES (around 20,000 
US$),4 whereas I additionally aimed at an equal number of contracts for each treatment 
(also this information was hidden). Consequently, I was able to offer 60 contracts in 
each of the two auctions. Due to number of farmers opting for drop-out, 44 action-
based and 54 outcome-based contracts were finally signed. Training on tree planting 
was offered to all contract holders, prior delivering free tree seedlings mid of 
December 2011.  
 
Notes: Auction participants assigned to one of the two treatments at the start of the auction. Photo taken by ICRAF. 
Monitoring 
Monitoring on the contract compliance was carried out by the research team in 
collaboration with the Kenya Forest Service (KFS), and in presence of the landholders. 
In February 2012, all participants were monitored on whether they had planted the 
trees at their riparian area. The landholders with action-based contracts were 
additionally monitored on the compliance with the tree-watering requirement. Second 
monitoring followed in March 2012, wherein further monitoring on the soil moisture 
                                                        
4 I use the exchange rate from 14 December 2011: 1 US$ = 88 KSh (www.oanda.com) 
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did not take place due to the rain start. Farmers with the outcome-based contracts 
were monitored on the tree survivals at the end of the contract period, in June 2012. At 
the same time, tree survival rates of the action-based PES scheme were recorded for 
the research purpose (Table 1). 
Table 1 Monitoring  
 Type of monitoring Trees planted Soil kept moist around trees Tree survival 
 Feb 2012 Feb 2012 March 2012 June 2012 
Action-based contracts  
   
 
On contract compliance ✓ ✓ ✓ ✕ 
For research purpose ✕ ✕ ✕ ✓ 
Outcome-based contracts     
On contract compliance ✓ ✕ ✕ ✓ 
For research purpose ✕ ✕ ✕ ✕ 
 
Pay-offs and evaluation 
The conservation payments were awarded in July 2012, and subsequently an 
evaluation survey with the contract holders was conducted. There was no further 
obligation for the participants to keep the trees standing or to take care of them. 
Whether the participants received the whole or reduced conservation payment was 
conditional on the above contract type conditions and monitoring results. Regardless 
of the monitoring results all farmers were guaranteed 10 percent of their bids as a base 
payment, which was paid at the beginning of the contract period. 
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3. Action- and outcome-based payments for environmental services:  
An experimental auction for tree planting contracts in Kenya 
3.1. Objectives and hypotheses 
Auctions are argued to improve the cost-effectiveness of conservation contracts, with 
the competitive selection to reveal the private opportunity costs much more closely 
than posted offer mechanisms (Rolfe & Windle, 2011). However, while auctions are 
expected to reduce the informational rents, linking payments to outcomes might result 
into risk premiums (Goddard et al., 2008; Schilizzi & Latacz-Lohmann, 2016). The main 
aim of this chapter is to examine the treatment effect of the performance-based 
approach on the bid formation, wherein I analyze bids for action- and outcome-based 
contracts. Further, I compare the budgetary effectiveness of the two treatments. 
The chapter examines the first and second hypotheses of the dissertation: 
1. Tendering outcome-based contracts results in risk premiums and thus higher 
bid values (risk effect), compared to the action-based treatment; wherein 
2. Auction for action-based contracts results into higher budgetary effectiveness. 
3.2. Results 
3.3. Conservation auction 
Socio-economic context  
In the targeted population 62 percent were cash crop farmers who planted mainly 
coffee (96 percent) or tea (3 percent)5. The remaining 38 percent of the farmers 
planted food crops, with mainly maize (77 percent) followed by beans (15 percent).6 
We describe the latter as subsistence farmers, since they produce predominantly for 
their own consumption and only partly sell their production at local markets. 
                                                        
5 Macadamia nuts are also considered as a cash crop (about one percent). 
6 Further food crops in descending order by frequency: Fruits, leaves vegetables, arrow roots, tomatoes, napier 
grass 
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Subsistence farmers then dominate in the lower altitudes, and cash crop farmers in the 
higher altitudes that provide suitable climate for coffee and/or tea. Further, the 
average yearly gross household´s income was 208,087 KSh (2,365 USD), with standard 
deviation of 368,781 KSh (4,191 USD). In this regard, the household’s income of 
subsistence farmers was 31 percent lower, compared to cash crop farmers, which has 
qualified the farm type as proxy for low or high income.7 The average schooling 
represented 7.9 years, with standard deviation of 4.7 year, and the main ethnic group 
was Kiembu (92.5 percent). Finally, the study area was characterized by small land 
holdings, with an average household´s land size of 2.9 acres, and standard deviation of 
4.6 acres. The average land strip along the river – riparian area - in the study area has 
65 meters, with standard deviation of 87 meters.  
Summary statistics  
117 landholders submitted their bids in each of the two 
auction treatments. The density estimates of bids show 
that in both treatments there is a great variation in the 
bids that range from 200 KSh to 240,000 KSh (Figure 6). 
Further, both distributions are positively skewed,8 with 
higher skewness and bid variation under the action-based 
treatment.9 In the action-based auction the mean bid is 
29,406 KSh and the median is 25,000 KSh, compared to 
the mean of 26,126 KSh and the median of 26,000 KSh in 
the outcome-based auction. Neither the means nor the 
distributions of bids are significantly different.10  
                                                        
7 Two-sample t-test with equal variances of log total income on subsistence farm type (0/1): diff=0.311, p=0.001. 
8 Skewness/Kurtosis: action-based (4.177/24.281), outcome-based (1.072/7.077). 
9 Coefficients of variation [(standard deviation/mean)*100 ]: Action-based (1.10), outcome-based (0.49).  
10 A two sample t-test for equal means by auction treatment (action-based 0/1): -3,280 (p=0.311). 
A two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distribution: p=0.125. 
Notes: Participant indicates his bid 
on the bidding sheet. Photo by ICRAF. 
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Figure 6 Bid distributions by auction treatment 
 
Notes: Density estimates of bids with underlying histograms for the action- and outcome-based auction treatments. 
One action-based bid of 10,000,000 KSh represents an outlier and is excluded from the bid analyses.  
Regression analysis  
I transformed the original metric state of bid into natural logarithm, in order to account 
for the non-linearity in the relationship between the bid amount and the predictors. 
Consequently, the coefficients on explanatory variables can be interpreted as percent 
changes in bids. First, regressing bids (in logs) on the treatment, gender, and farm type 
– the income level proxy - shows a statistically significant gender effect, with men 
submitting 24 percent higher bids than women, and no treatment effect (Table 2: 
column 1). Testing for combined effects then reveals statistically significant treatment 
interactions, which proposes that a treatment effect depends on participant´s gender 
(Table 2: columns 2) and farm type (Table 2: columns 3), or conversely, the 
associations between the bids and gender and the bids and farm type depend on the 
treatment. 
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Table 2 Treatment effect  
 (1) OLS  (2) OLS  (3) OLS  
Action-based treat. (0/1) -0.196 (0.124) -0.444* (0.174) -0.425* (0.165) 
Male (0/1) 0.244+ (0.124) -0.006 (0.117)   
Subsistence farm (0/1) 0.130 (0.125)   -0.160 (0.121) 
Interactiona   0.510* (0.245)   
Interactionb     0.592* (0.247) 
Constant 9.843*** (0.085) 10.013*** (0.062) 10.070*** (0.071) 
Observations 218  218  218  
Joint F-statistic 2.17+  2.40+  3.04*  
R-squared 0.034  0.048  0.041  
Adjusted R-squared 0.020  0.035  0.027  
Notes: (1) OLS regression of logarithm bid on the treatment type, gender, and farm type. (2) OLS regression of 
logarithm bid on the treatment type and the treatment interaction with gender. (3) OLS regression of logarithm bid 
on the treatment type and the treatment interaction with farm type. Robust standard errors are in parentheses 
(Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity in (1) - (3) regression models: p<0.01).  
P-values: + p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. a Interaction term for the treatment and gender.  
b Interaction term for the treatment and farm type. Dummy variables are described as (0/1), with “no” coded as 0, 
and “yes” coded as 1. The variable “subsistence farm” refers to the farm type with food crop production only, as 
opposed to the cash crop farm type with coffee and/or tea production. For 15 bidders out of 234 (seven in the 
action-based and eight in the outcome-based treatment) the baseline information is not provided. One bid of 
10,000,000 KSh represents an outlier and is excluded from the analysis. 
Further, accounting for influential observations shows that, while the treatment-
gender interaction effect remains statistically significant (Table 3: column 1), the 
model regressing bids on the treatment-farm type interaction term is jointly 
insignificant (Table 3: column 2). To explain this I further examine the influential bids 
that might result from strategic bidding or cost miscalculation.  
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Table 3 Treatment effect - Influential observations omitted 
 (1) OLS  (2) OLS  
Action-based treatment (0/1) -0.164 (0.109) -0.136 (0.102) 
Male (0/1) 0.085 (0.108)   
Subsistence farm (0/1)   -0.136 (0.114) 
Interactiona 0.259+ (0.156)   
Interactionb   0.260 (0.162) 
Constant 10.013*** (0.075) 10.105*** (0.070) 
Observations 207  207  
Joint F-statistic 3.43*  0.92  
R-squared 0.048  0.013  
Adjusted R-squared 0.034  -0.001  
Notes: (1) OLS regression of logarithm bid on treatment type and the treatment interaction with gender. Influential 
observations excluded based on Cook´s D>4/218. (Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity: 
0.526). (2) OLS regression of logarithm bid on treatment type and the treatment interaction with the farm type. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. Influential observations excluded based on Cook´s D>4/218.  
P-values: + p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. a Interaction term for the treatment and gender. b Interaction 
term for the treatment and the farm type. For description of variables see Table 2.  
Particularly, using the Cook´s D procedure, nine extremely low and two extremely high 
bids were identified as influential observations (Table 4). Cash crop farmers then 
mainly submitted the extremely low bids, wherein subsistence farmers requested the 
two extremely high bids. At the same time, the extreme bid values have been submitted 
almost exclusively in the action-based treatment. Hence, this combination seems to 
explain the excessive influence that was exerted on the interaction term coefficient. 
Further, the comparisons of the single and combined effects models via likelihood ratio 
test suggest including the treatment interaction with gender into the regression 
models, but dropping the treatment-farm type interaction term. 
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Table 4 Influential bids 
Bid (in KSh) Treatment Contract signed Gender Farm type 
200 Action-based No Female Cash crop 
200 Action-based No Female Subsistence 
500 Action-based Yes Female Cash crop 
600 Action-based No Male Cash crop 
900 Action-based No Male Cash crop 
1,000 Action-based No Male Cash crop 
1,800 Action-based No Female Cash crop 
2,000 Outcome-based Yes Male Subsistence 
2,400 Outcome-based Yes Male Cash crop 
150,000 Action-based No Male Subsistence 
240,000 Action-based No Male Subsistence 
Notes: Observations with Cook´s D value above 4/218. Based on regression model in Table 3 (column 2). 
Further, the treatment-gender interaction term remains statistically significant when 
including additional explanatory variables (Table 5). Simultaneously, while the 
inclusion of personal characteristics increases model´s predictive ability and shows 
other significant bid determinants (Table 5: column 2), the model regressing bids on 
opportunity costs variables is, however, jointly insignificant (Table 5: column 1). 
Finally, the interaction and bid determinants parameters stay stable in the full model 
that involves all regressors (Table 5: column 3). 
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Table 5 Treatment effect and bid determinants 
 (1) OLS  (2) OLS   (3) OLS   
Treatment & Gender & Interaction        
Action-based treatment (0/1) -0.151 (0.111) -0.275** (0.104) -0.261* (0.110) 
Male (0/1) 0.080 (0.105) 0.103 (0.101) 0.102 (0.112) 
Interaction term a 0.271+ (0.162) 0.343* (0.147) 0.338* (0.164) 
Opportunity costs characteristics           
Income & Land       
Total yearly income (in log) 0.011 (0.048)   0.019 (0.050) 
Subsistence farm (0/1) 0.003 (0.095)   -0.041 (0.095) 
Total land (acres) 0.018 (0.020)   0.02 (0.015) 
Labor & Technology       
Stated labor constrains (0/1) 0.033 (0.077)   -0.075 (0.078) 
Irrigation technology (0/1) -0.026 (0.115)   -0.013 (0.131) 
Personal characteristics         
Age (years)   0.006+ (0.003) 0.004 (0.003) 
Education (years)   -0.001 (0.010) -0.005 (0.013) 
Group participation (0/1)   0.053 (0.088) 0.038 (0.094) 
Organization involvement (0/1)   0.050 (0.078) 0.051 (0.079) 
General life satisfaction (0-3)   0.099* (0.042) 0.110* (0.044) 
Risk attitudes (0-10)   0.049** (0.018) 0.052** (0.018) 
Trust to locals (0-3)   -0.103* (0.044) -0.107* (0.045) 
Discount rate (0-2)   -0.021 (0.046) -0.026 (0.047) 
Constant 9.825*** (0.570) 9.465*** (0.242) 9.358*** (0.560) 
Observations 207  203  203  
Wald chi-squared 10.27  39.50***  45.67***  
R-squared 0.055  0.163  0.175  
Adjusted R-squared 0.017  0.115  0.104  
Notes: (1) OLS regression of logarithm bid on the treatment, participant´s gender, the treatment interaction with gender, and opportunity costs characteristics. 
Influential observations excluded based on Cook´s D>4/218. (2) OLS regression of logarithm bid on the treatment, participant´s gender, the treatment 
interaction with gender, and personal characteristics. Influential observations excluded based on Cook´s D>4/214. (3) OLS regression of logarithm bid on the 
treatment, participant´s gender, the treatment interaction with gender, and the opportunity costs and personal characteristics. Influential observations 
excluded based on Cook´s D>4/214. Bootstrapped VCE errors (1,000 replications) are in parentheses. P-values: + p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. For 20 
bidders the baseline information is not fully provided, resulting in 214 observations. a Interaction term for the treatment and gender. The counterfactual for 
action-based treatment is outcome-based treatment. Dummy variables are described as (0/1), with “no” coded as 0, and “yes” coded as 1. The range for 
categorical variables is provided in parentheses. Subsistence farm refers to the farm type with food crop production only, as opposed to the cash crop farm type 
with coffee and/or tea production. Irrigation technology means the use of river irrigation. Group participation refers to community groups such as self-help 
groups, women´s and youth groups. Organization involvement refers to prior exposure to agricultural extensions, water resource associations, and 
conservation initiatives. Higher general satisfaction corresponds to greater life satisfaction. Higher trust level corresponds to higher trust towards people in the 
local area. Higher discount rate corresponds to lower time preference. Higher risk attitude corresponds to higher risk seeking (see p.71). 
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Displaying the margins of the interaction term then clearly shows differences in men´s 
and women´s bids across and within the two treatments (Figure 7). Using the pairwise 
comparisons of predictive margins we reveal a significant treatment effect, with 
women submitting 23 percent lower bids in the action-based compared to the 
outcome-based treatment (Table 6: row 2). Furthermore, there is a significant gender 
effect within the action-based treatment, with increase in men´s opposed to women´s 
bids by 55 percent (Table 6: row 4). Changing the base of comparison, there is 30 
percent increase in female bids in the outcome-based compared to the action-based 
treatment, and 36 percent decrease in women´s versus men´s action-based bids. On the 
contrary, there is no statistically significant difference in men´s action-based and 
outcome-based bids (Table 6: row 3), and women´s and men´s bids are statistically 
undistinguishable in the auction for outcome-based contracts (Table 6: row 1). 
Figure 7 Predictive margins of the bids for the treatment-gender interaction 
 
Notes: Predictive margins of the bids for the treatment-gender interaction term with 95% confidence intervals, 
calculated from predictions of the OLS regression of logarithm bid on gender of the auction participant, the 
treatment and the treatment interaction with gender, and the opportunity costs and personal characteristics  
(Table 5: column 3). Influential observations excluded based on Cook´s D>4/214. As in the regression model the bid 
is transformed into natural logarithm, the predictions are exponentiated in order to show the effects in KSh. 
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Three additional variables were significantly associated with the bids - life satisfaction, 
risk attitudes, and trust behavior (Table 5: columns 2-3). Life satisfaction was 
positively correlated with household´s income, and thus can be probably interpreted in 
terms of opportunity costs increasing with the wealth.11 The increase in bids with 
increasing risk seeking is consistent with the prediction on risk aversion to reduce 
willingness to accept (see 1.1). The drop in bids with increasing level of trust towards 
locals lead us to speculate on the farmers to expect less conflicts and more support 
when implementing the contract. On the contrary, none of the opportunity costs 
variables – neither the income, farm type, land size nor the reported labor constraints 
or the availability of irrigation technology - have significantly determined the bids.  
Table 6 Pairwise comparisons of predictive margins  
Treatment interaction with Effect Contrast  
(KSh)a 
Contrast 
(%)b 
Gender      
(1) Outcome-based#Male vs. Outcome-based#Female  Within subject 2,468 (2,745) 10.71  
(2) Action-based#Female vs. Outcome-based#Female  Treatment effect -5,297* (2,180) -23.02  
(3) Action-based#Male vs. Outcome-based#Male  Treatment effect 2,024 (2,984) 7.93  
(4) Action-based#Male vs. Action-based#Female Within subject 9,789*** (2,781) 55.24  
 Observations  203    
Notes: Pairwise comparisons of predictive margins of the bids for the treatment-gender interaction term, calculated 
from predictions of the OLS regression of logarithm bid on gender of the auction participant, the treatment and the 
treatment interaction with gender, and the opportunity costs and personal characteristics (Table 5: column 3). 
Influential observations excluded based on Cook´s D>4/214. P-values: + p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. 
Bootstrapped VCE errors are in parentheses. a Contrast decomposes the effects of the treatments and gender on the 
bids into comparisons against reference categories. As in the regression model the bid is transformed into natural 
logarithm, I exponentiated the predictive margins in order to show the effects in KSh.  b The effects of the treatment 
and gender on the bids expressed in percentages, with predictive margins (Figure 7) as reference categories:  
1 2,467.911/23,034.59=0.107; 2 -5,296.783/23,034.59=-0.230; 3 2,024.316/25,502.5=0.079;  
4 9,789.011/17,737.81=0.552. 
Finally, replacing the bid amount by the bid rank provided a robustness check of the 
bid analysis, wherein “the ranking preserves the ascending sorting of the bids while 
eliminating outliers” (Jack, 2010, p. 15). Particularly, the variable parameters in the bid 
                                                        
11 Ordered logistic regression of satisfaction levels (0-3) on the household´s income (in log): coefficient=0.232; 
p=0.017. 
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rank regressions – in terms of coefficient signs and significance levels – are consistent 
with the foregoing bid amount analysis that excluded influential bids (Table 7). 
Table 7 Bid rank robustness check 
 (1) OLS  (2) OLS  (3) OLS  
Treatment & Gender & Interaction       
Action-based treatment (0/1) -20.938+ (12.660) -31.836** (11.074) -31.591* (12.451) 
Male (0/1) 8.140 (11.675) 6.080 (12.144) 5.751 (12.374) 
Interactiona 32.819+ (17.380) 45.607* (17.734) 45.246* (18.408) 
Opportunity costs characteristics       
Income & Land       
Total yearly income (in log) 3.291 (6.510)   3.344 (6.883) 
Subsistence farm (0/1) 3.617 10.098   1.522 10.783 
Total land (acres) 0.243 (2.301)   0.490 (2.326) 
Labor & Technology       
Stated labor constrains (0/1) 3.536 (9.027)   -1.228 (9.048) 
Irrigation technology (0/1) -1.596 (13.221)   2.056 (15.057) 
Personal characteristics       
Age (years)   0.417 (0.384) 0.398 (0.443) 
Education (years)   -0.444 (1.144) -0.711 (1.400) 
Group participation (0/1)   -1.412 (9.931) -3.008 (10.132) 
Organization involvement (0/1)   7.388 (9.664) 7.792 (9.991) 
General satisfaction (0-3)   8.800+ (4.855) 9.325+ (4.852) 
Risk attitudes (0-10)   4.162* (2.111) 4.211+ (2.206) 
Trust to locals (0-3)   -10.806+ (5.928) -10.764+ (5.936) 
Discount rate (0-2)   -2.752 (5.311) -2.819 (5.361) 
Constant 72.934 (78.682) 80.431* (31.143) 45.543 (89.273) 
Observations 218  214  214  
Wald chi-squared 12.15  29.62**  28.99*  
R-squared 0.057  0.116  0.118  
Adjusted R-squared 0.012  0.068  0.037  
Notes: (1) OLS regression of bid rank (in ascending order) on the treatment, participant´s gender, the treatment interaction with 
gender, and opportunity costs characteristics. (2) OLS regression of bid rank on the treatment, participant´s gender, the treatment 
interaction with gender, and personal characteristics. (3) OLS regression of bid rank on the treatment type and the treatment 
interaction with gender, and opportunity costs and personal characteristics. Bootstrapped VCE errors (1,000 replications) are in 
parentheses. P-values: + p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. a Interaction term for the treatment and gender. The counterfactual for 
action-based treatment is outcome-based treatment. Dummy variables are described as (0/1). For description of variables see Table 5. 
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Overall, the predictive ability of the regression models is rather low when it explains at 
most 18 percent of the variation in the bids; if considering the adjusted R-squared then 
the predictive power does not exceed 12 percent (Table 5). This can be partly 
explained by the binary and categorical variables explaining a scale dependent 
variable. It might, however, also imply that though controlling for a set of variables a 
part of the bid formation remains unobserved. Nonetheless, despite of the noise a 
fraction of the variation in bids could be explained, and highly significant and 
consistent effects could be revealed. Moreover, I found that participant´s gender and 
other personal characteristics rather than opportunity costs observables determined 
the bids. Chapter 5 provides possible explanations for the gendered impacts on bids. 
 
Notes: Auction participants submit their bidding sheets in sealed envelopes. Photo taken by ICRAF. 
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Strategic bidding and winner´s curse 
Ideally, the bid would reveal the landholder´s opportunity costs of implementing the 
conservation contract; however, „the bid curves contain an element of strategic 
overbidding and thus do not represent true opportunity costs” (Latacz-Lohmann & 
Schilizzi, 2005, p. 52). In other words, besides the opportunity costs the bids contain 
bidder´s expectations about the maximum payment (Latacz-Lohmann & Schilizzi, 
2005; Latacz-Lohmann & van der Hamsvoort, 1997). In the field trial, the most 
frequent bid value in the auction (36,000 KSh) corresponded to an average daily wage 
times the contract period.12 Moreover, 87 percent of bids were lower (71 percent) or 
equal (16 percent) to this wage-based amount, suggesting that for most landholders 
36,000 KSh was either the maximum expected opportunity cost, or the maximum 
expected payment we would offer. The latter would suggest strategic behavior in the 
bid formation. 
At the same time, „a risk of losing a contract at a favorable price can also lead to 
downward bid shading”, and thus the direction of the strategic bidding is potentially 
ambiguous (Jack, 2010, p. 25). Also, the bidders may underestimate their opportunity 
costs as result of incorrectly formed expectations, ex post shocks or misunderstanding 
of the valuation task (Jack, 2010, p. 7). In this regard, if the willingness to accept of the 
selected bidder is lower than the opportunity costs, then, he or she faces the winner´s 
curse. Stoneham et al. (2003, p. 484) generally define the winner´s curse as “the 
situation where an item is allocated to the most optimistic bidder (in this study the 
bidder with the lowest valuation), rather than the bidder whose valuation is closest to 
the true valuation.” Predominantly in the action-based treatment a number of bidders 
requested very low bids, wherein only few of them later also signed the offered 
contract. This led me to hypothesize on the winner´s curse, which was later confirmed 
by the exit interviews, when the landholders reasoned the contract rejection by the 
payment being insufficient.  
                                                        
12 200 KSh per day over 180 days = 36,000 KSh. 
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In summary, the consistent and highly significant bid effects show that the bids 
reflected landholders´ characteristics, though the observed strategic elements in 
bidding suggest that the opportunity costs were not fully disclosed. In this context, the 
uniform price auction increases the incentive to reveal costs. However, as all bidders 
receive the same payment, especially low cost bidders are overpaid, which may or may 
not, subject to the extent of costs revelation, lead to lower budgetary effectiveness 
compared to discriminative bidding (Cason & Gangadharan, 2004; Stoneham et al., 
2003). Further, multiple auction rounds would allow the participants to “get a better 
sense of the true contract value” of the contract, and thus mitigate the winner´s curse 
(Stoneham et al., 2003, p. 484); however, they also increase administration costs when 
after each round bids have to be evaluated (Cason & Gangadharan, 2004), and might 
lead to the effectiveness eroding learning effect (Hailu & Schilizzi, 2004). Finally, 
another important consideration beyond my preference for the one-shot 
discriminatory price auction was that both uniform pricing and multiple rounds are 
more complex and might represent a barrier in comprehending the auction allocation 
(Ayaji et al., 2012; Latacz-Lohmann & Schilizzi, 2005, p. 25). 
Comparison to contingent valuation 
The baseline survey, conducted prior the auction, has contained following contingent 
valuation question: If you were offered a payment for planting 30 tree seedlings in 
December at your riparian area, and for the subsequent care for the trees for six 
months, what would be the amount of payment you would accept? 
First, though a direct comparison of contingent valuation to the bids has its limitation, 
given the former was a hypothetical question and the latter a real stake experiment, 
the results let me suggest that – against the expectations - the competitive bidding has 
not reduced the willingness to accept. Particularly, comparing the means of contingent 
values and bid offers show statistically undistinguishable results (Table 8). 
Consequently, using an experimental setting would enable a more reliable comparison 
of the different willingness to accept elicitation methods; which is beyond the scope of 
this study, but might be of interest for further research. 
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Table 8 Means of contingent valuation and bids 
 N Mean  Median 
(1) Paired t-test     
Bid 209 27,143 (22,721) - 
Contingent valuation 209 25,180 (19,601) - 
Difference 1,963    
(2) Two-sample t-test with equal variances     
Bid 233 27,759 (24,643) 25,200 
Contingent valuation 372 25,588 (22,960) 20,000 
Difference 2,171    
Notes: Means and medians of bid amounts (treatments combined) and willingness to accept in contingent valuation 
(in KSh). Standard deviations are in parentheses. (1) Difference in means using paired t-test: p=0.282. (2) Difference 
in means using two-sample t-test with equal variances: p=0.272. 55 landholders, 24 of them auction participants, 
have not provided answer to the contingent valuation question, resulting into 372 observations in the two-sample  
t-test, and 209 observations in the paired t-test. 
Second, regressing the contingent values on observable variables shows that there is 
consistency in the significant effects of gender and risk attitudes between the auction 
and contingent valuation (Table 9). This provides further robustness check of the bid 
analysis, and suggests that the landholders reflected well-defined cost and risk 
expectations into their willingness to accept. The possible drivers for the gendered 
heterogeneity in willingness to accept are analyzed below in Chapter 5. Finally, neither 
trust nor life satisfaction - the other bid determinants - have impacted the contingent 
valuation, whilst the hypothetical values are additionally determined by the farm type 
and respondent´s age.  
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Table 9 Contingent valuation determinants 
 (1) OLS  (2) OLS  (3) OLS  
Opportunity costs characteristics       
Income & Land       
Total yearly income (in log) 0.090+ (0.048)   0.041 (0.055) 
Subsistence farm (0/1) 0.222* (0.094)   0.210* (0.097) 
Total land (acres) 0.004 (0.017)   0.026 (0.015) 
Labor & Technology       
Stated labor constrains (0/1) -0.067 (0.085)   -0.117 (0.087) 
Irrigation technology (0/1) 0.120 (0.119)   -0.002 (0.012) 
Personal characteristics        
Male (0/1)   0.160+ (0.083) 0.194* (0.083) 
Age (years)   -0.005+ (0.003) -0.007* (0.003) 
Education (years)   -0.009 (0.011) -0.009 (0.012) 
Group participation (0/1)   0.090 (0.092) 0.017 (0.096) 
Organization involvement (0/1)   -0.143 (0.090) -0.153+ (0.090) 
General satisfaction (0-3)   -0.002 (0.040) -0.016 (0.041) 
Risk attitudes (0-10)   0.071*** (0.017) 0.088*** (0.018) 
Trust to locals (0-3)   0.022 (0.049) -0.013 (0.050) 
Discount rate (0-2)   -0.085+ (0.049) -0.064 (0.047) 
Constant 8.699*** (0.566) 9.770*** (0.223) 9.304*** (0.620) 
Observations 352  346  344  
Wald chi-squared 11.62*  31.56***  54.36***  
R-squared 0.029  0.070  0.124  
Adjusted R-squared 0.015  0.045  0.087  
Notes: In order to account for the non-linearity in the relationship between the contingent values and the 
explanatory variables the original metric state is transformed into natural logarithm. (1) OLS regression of 
willingness to accept (log-transformed) on opportunity costs characteristics. Influential observations excluded 
based on Cook´s D>4/371. (2) OLS regression of willingness to accept (log-transformed) on personal characteristics. 
Influential observations excluded based on Cook´s D>4/366. (3) OLS regression of willingness to accept  
(log-transformed) on opportunity costs and personal characteristics. Influential observations excluded based on 
Cook´s D>4/365. Bootstrapped VCE errors (1,000 replications) are in parentheses. P-values: + p<0.1, * p<0.05,  
** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Dummy variables are described as (0/1), with “no” coded as 0, and “yes” coded as 1. The 
range for categorical variables is provided in parentheses. For description of variables see Table 5. 55 landholders 
have not provided answer to the contingent valuation question, resulting into (at most) 372 observations. The 
contingent valuation question: If you were offered a payment for planting 30 tree seedlings in December at your 
riparian area, and for the subsequent care for the trees for six months, what would be the amount of payment you 
would accept? 
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3.4. Budgetary effectiveness  
Effectiveness of PES schemes can be defined as the achievement of a specific 
environmental outcome at the least possible costs, or as the maximum environmental 
benefit achievable for a given budget. Since most conservation agencies are budget 
constrained I use the latter definition; that of the maximum outcome for money spent, 
and refer to it as to budgetary effectiveness.  
Figure 8 Individual bids and allocation by auction treatment (in log scale) 
   
Figure 8 presents the bids as cumulative distribution functions when the horizontal 
axis illustrates submitted bids sorted in an ascending price order, and the vertical axis 
the corresponding bid ranks. The horizontal line at the 60th bid rank represents the 
number of selected conservation contracts, resulting in the bid caps of 25,000 KSh for 
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the action-based, and 27,000 KSh for the outcome-based treatment.13 The graphical 
depiction shows (i) a considerably steeper action-based curve in the bid range from 
9,000 KSh to 18,000 KSh, and (ii) a number of extremely low action-based bids. 
Given that the bid curves differed in the first quartile, when the bids were selected in 
the ascending order, the winning bids were significantly lower for action-based than 
outcome-based contracts (Table 10: row 2). However, the effectiveness gain of the 
selected bids in the action-based versus outcome-based auction has been lost due to 
drop-outs, wherein the means for contracts that were finally signed are statistically 
undistinguishable (Table 10: row 3). Particularly, eleven bidders in the action-based, 
and one bidder in the outcome-based auction opted not to sign the contract, with the 
mean bid of the rejected contract offers being significantly lower compared to the 
contracts that were finally signed.14. Consequently, the second hypothesis on increased 
budget effectiveness of the auction for action-based contracts could not be confirmed, 
wherein the most of the low cost bidders opted for not signing the contract (see p.39).  
In addition, there were barriers in the contract allocation, wherein in each treatment 
five selected participants could not be contacted for contract signing.15 However, as 
this happened randomly, these bids do not significantly differ from the signed bids. 
Finally, out of 60 contract offers 44 were successfully concluded in the action-based, 
and 54 in the outcome-based treatment. The mean payment for a planted tree was then 
501 KSh in the action-based, and 554 KSh in the outcome-based treatment. 
  
                                                        
13 Given the budget constraint only one bid of 27,000 KSh could be accepted in the outcome-based treatment, 
wherein we used lottery to select one out of three bids of this value.  
14 Two-sample t-test with equal variances of bid on whether the selected bidder dropped out (0/1): 
difference=10,575; p=0.000; n=120. 
15 The selected bidders were contacted via cell phones, wherein for these participants the phone numbers did not 
go through, neither the village elders could successfully contact them. 
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Table 10 Means of submitted, selected, and contracted bids 
 
N Mean  Median 
(1) Submitted bids     
Action-based contract 116 29,406 (32,499) 25,000 
Outcome-based contract 117 26,126 (12,729) 26,000 
(2) Selected bids     
Action-based contract 60 13,028* (6,923) 12,000 
Outcome-based contract 60 16,456* (6,077) 18,000 
(3) Contracted bids 
  
  
Action-based contract 44 15,027 (5,915) 17,000 
Outcome-based contract 54 16,618 (5,900) 18,000 
Notes: Means and medians of bid amounts (in KSh) for submitted, selected, and contracted bids are 
reported for action- and outcome-based treatments. Standard deviations are in parentheses. Difference in 
means using two-sample t-test with equal variances. P-values: + p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.  
At the end of the contract period the PES participants were asked to estimate their 
“tree-planting cost for the six months period considering all costs, including leisure 
time, labor re-allocation, input costs, and other costs”. The estimates show 10,563 KSh 
to be the average realized cost in the action-based, and 10,736 KSh in the outcome-
based treatment (Table 11: row 1). Consequently, comparing the costs estimates to 
actual pay-offs suggests that the PES participants on average received payments above 
the realized costs (Table 11: row 2). Moreover, the contingent valuation assessed at the 
contract end fairly corresponds with the actual pay-offs (Table 11: row 3), suggesting 
that the PES participants considered the received payments as sufficient, but also that 
they were not willing to accept payments closer to the realized costs.16 The mean pay-
off for a surviving tree then was 573 KSh in the action-based, and 623 KSh in the 
outcome-based treatment (for tree survivals see Chapter 4).17 
  
                                                        
16 Evaluation survey question (n=98): What would be the lowest payment that would still encourage you to 
participate in the project? 
17 Two outcome-based contracts with flood damage excluded (see Table 12: row 2). 
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Table 11 Realized costs, pay-offs, and ex-post contingent valuation 
 Obs. Mean Median Min Max 
(1) Realized costs       
Action-based contract 44 10,563 (10,315) 7,000 1,000 50,000 
Outcome-based contract 54 10,736 (8,324) 9,000 1,250 43,680 
(2) Pay-offs       
Action-based contract 44 14,422 (6,535) 16,820 350 25,000 
Outcome-based contract 54 15,919 (6,106) 17,800 1,280 26,000 
(3) Ex post contingent valuation       
Action-based contract 44 13,180 (7,001) 13,200 2,000 25,000 
Outcome-based contract 54 15,449 (6,518) 15,000 2,400 30,000 
Notes: Summary statistics of (1) realized opportunity costs of the tree planting contract estimated by the PES 
participants at the end of the contract period, (2) actual pay-offs awarded to the PES participants (i.e. bids 
deducted by sanctions), and (3) minimum willingness to accept of PES participants stated at the end of the 
contract period. All figures are in KSh. Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
3.5. Discussion and conclusion 
The hypothesis on the risk effect to increase the bids for outcome-based contracts 
could be confirmed for female bidders. In particular, I found (i) women to submit 23 
percent lower bids in the action-based versus outcome-based treatment, and 
conversely 30 percent higher bids in the outcome-based versus action-based 
treatment. At the same time, men did not react differently to the two treatments. In 
addition, the comparison within the treatments reveals (ii) a statistically significant 
decrease of 36 percent in women´s versus men´s bids, or conversely an increase of 55 
percent in men´s versus women´s bids, in the action-based treatment.  
Further, there is evidence on the willingness to accept to contain strategic elements, 
when bidders bid above, but also below their true opportunity costs. While 
overbidding resulted in contract prices being on average higher than the realized costs, 
the winner´s curse led to contract drop-outs. Nonetheless, despite of the strategic 
behavior a fraction of the variation in bids could be explained, and highly significant 
and consistent effects could be revealed.  
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In this context, I found that - besides the participant´s gender - personal characteristics, 
such as life satisfaction, risk attitudes and trust behavior, rather than opportunity costs 
observables determined the bids. Moreover, I found the impacts of gender and risk 
behavior to be consistent with a contingent valuation elicitation, conducted prior the 
auction. This suggests that the landholders reflected well-defined cost and risk 
expectations into their willingness to accept. At the same time, however, I revealed that 
the competitive bidding has not reduced the willingness to accept, as proposed by the 
auction literature. In addition, the contingent valuation assessed at the contract end 
suggests that the PES participants were not willing to accept payments closer to the 
realized costs. 
Finally, the average bid selected in the action-based treatment was significantly lower, 
compared to the outcome-based treatment. However, the potentially high effectiveness 
gains of the action-based auction have been neutralized due to a high drop-out rate of 
the low-cost bidders. Consequently, I could not confirm the second hypothesis on 
increased budgetary effectiveness of the auction for action-based contracts. The 
revealed gender effects, however, imply that it might be cheaper and thus more 
effective for the conservation agency to award action-based contracts to women. 
However, the increase in women´s bids in the outcome-based treatment shows that 
tendering outcome-based contracts might neutralize the potential effectiveness gains 
of targeting women. Thus, I found that the choice of the contract type might – as result 
of gendered bidding behavior - define the budgetary effectiveness. Possible 
explanations for the gendered impacts on bids are provided in Chapter 5. 
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4. Action- and outcome-based payments for environmental services: 
Environmental performance of tree planting contracts in Kenya 
4.1. Objectives and hypotheses 
Most conservation payments are 
linked to actions that are expected to 
lead to the desired outcome (Latacz-
Lohmann & Schilizzi, 2005). It is, 
however, argued that increasing the 
degree of conditionality is desirable, 
as outcome-based payments in 
contrast to the standard prescription 
approach are expected to increase 
the environmental outcome. 
Particularly, they offer flexibility to 
choose how to achieve the targeted outcome, and are expected to enhance intrinsic 
motivation (Holm-Müller et al., 2006; Matzdorf & Lorenz, 2010; Schwarz et al., 2008; 
Zabel & Roe, 2009).  
The chapter examines the third and fourth hypotheses of the dissertation: 
3. Outcome-based contracts, compared to action-based contracts, achieve better 
environmental performance; wherein  
4. Outcome-based approach incentivizes a choice of tree care actions expected to 
lead to the desired outcome (incentive effect), and enhances intrinsic 
motivation. 
 
Notes: The farmer inter-planted the tree seedlings with the 
agricultural produce at his riparian bank. September 2013, 
one year after the project end. 
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4.2. Results 
4.3. Environmental performance 
Summary statistics 
The environmental performance is measured as the number of surviving trees, out of 
thirty, at the end of the six months contract period. The density estimates of the tree 
survivals with underlying histograms show left skewed distributions, when in both 
treatments there is high density of high values (Figure 9). Particularly, 16 and 15 
percent of participants with action- and outcome-based contracts, respectively, 
achieved the maximum survival rate of 30 trees, and in both treatments about 55 
percent of participants achieved tree survival rate of at least 90 percent (27 trees).  
Figure 9 Tree survival by contract type/treatment 
 
The mean survival was 25.18 trees in the action-based, and 24.80 trees in the outcome-
based treatment (Table 12: row 1). Excluding two cases of immense flood damage from 
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the analysis - when the landholders could not prevent it – then increases the mean in 
the outcome-based treatment to 25.54 trees (Table 12: row 2). Further, neither the 
means nor the distributions of the tree survivals reveal statistically significant 
differences between the treatments.18  
Table 12 Summary statistics of tree survivals 
 
Obs. Mean Median Min Max 
(1) Tree survivals       
Action-based contract 44 25.18 (5.56) 27 6 30 
Outcome-based contract 54 24.80 (6.02) 27 0 30 
(2) Tree survivals – excluding flood damage       
Action-based contract 44 25.18 (5.56) 27 6 30 
Outcome-based contract 52 25.54 (4.61) 27 9 30 
Notes: (1) Summary statistics including means of tree survivals for action-based and outcome-based 
contracts. (2) Summary statistics including means of tree survivals for action-based and outcome-based 
contracts, when two observations (both in the outcome-based treatment) were dropped from the analysis 
due to flood damage (with 19 and 30 trees swept away). Standard deviations are in parentheses.  
Regression analysis  
Examining the tree survival determinants in OLS regression framework shows men to 
achieve about 2.1 trees (7 percent) more surviving trees than women. Further, the tree 
survival was increasing with participation in a community group and the conservation 
payment amount, and conversely, decreasing with years of education (Table 13: 
columns 1-3). On the contrary, the tree survivals did not differ for the action- and 
outcome-based treatments, nor there was significant interaction of the treatment with 
gender. In addition, I examined differences in tree survivals at the village level, as there 
might be village-based differences such as climate and soil conditions. This was, 
however, not confirmed, as controlling for the village or area effects has not revealed 
statistically significant differences.19 
                                                        
18 (1) All contracts: A two sample t-test for equal means: difference=-0.386; p=0.745; n=98. A two-sample 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distribution: p=0.938. (2) Excluding two contracts with flood damage: A 
two sample t-test for equal means: difference=0.357; p=0.732; n=96. A two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for 
equality of distribution: p=0.985. 
19 Likelihood ratio test of mixed effects ML regression with village as group variable: p=1.000. Likelihood ratio test 
of mixed effects ML regression with area (FDA) as group variable: p=1.000. 
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Table 13 Tree survival determinants  
 (1) OLS  (2) OLS  (3) OLS  
Treatment & Gender       
Action-based treatment (0/1) -0.381 (1.118) -0.498 (1.128) -0.075 (1.057) 
Male (0/1) 2.086* (0.965) 2.134* (1.030) 2.067* (1.001) 
Conservation payment       
Payment in units of 10,000 KSh     2,108+ (1.121) 
Opportunity costs characteristics       
Income & Land       
Total yearly income (in log)   0.774 (0.592) 0.728 (0.643) 
Subsistence farm (0/1)   1.197 (1.207) 1.386 (1.219) 
Total land (acres)   -0.346 (0.294) -0.360 (0.279) 
Labor & Technology       
Stated labor constrains (0/1)   -0.642 (1.141) -0.469 (1.098) 
Irrigation technology (0/1)   1.701 (1.523) 2.032 (1.760) 
Personal characteristics        
Age (years) -0.037 (0.047) -0.004 (0.054) -0.011 (0.053) 
Education (years) -0.287* (0.138) -0.249+ (0.150) -0.249+ (0.145) 
Group participation (0/1) 2.790* (1.358) 2.688+ (1.567) 2.402+ (1.428) 
Organization involvement (0/1) 1.453 (1.024) 1.211 (1.050) 0.483 (1.034) 
General life satisfaction (0-3) 0.093 (0.686) -0.168 (0.762) -0.160 (0.698) 
Risk attitudes (0-10) -0.094 (0.206) -0.120 (0.231) -0.089 (0.223) 
Trust to locals (0-3) -0.038 (0.583) -0.039 (0.647) -0.028 (0.609) 
Discount rate (0-2) 0.512 (0.643) 0.600 (0.638) 0.515 (0.598) 
Constant 26.105*** (3.541) 16.141* (7.680) 13.608+ (7.671) 
Observations 95  95  95  
Wald chi-squared 21.75*  24.67+  26.46*  
R-squared 0.202  0.248  0.295  
Adjusted R-squared 0.107  0.105  0.150  
Notes: (1) OLS regression of the tree survivals on the treatment, gender, and the personal characteristics. (2) OLS 
regression of the tree survivals on the treatment, gender, and the opportunity costs and personal characteristics.  
(3) OLS regression of the number of surviving trees on the treatment, gender, the conservation payment amount, 
and the opportunity costs and personal characteristics. Bootstrapped VCE errors (1,000 replications) are in 
parentheses. P-values: + p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Two observations were dropped from the analyses 
due to flood damage (with 19 and 30 trees swept away), and one respondent did not provide answer on risk 
attitudes; resulting in 95 observations. Dummy variables are described as (0/1), with “no” coded as 0, and “yes” 
coded as 1. The range for categorical variables is provided in parentheses. For description of variables see Table 5. 
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Further, the negative effect of education might be possibly clarified by the opportunity 
costs being increasing with the education level. Social network benefits in terms of 
labor sharing and conflict prevention might perhaps explain the positive effect of group 
participation. The revealed association between the variations in the tree survivals and 
the payment amounts shows that the environmental performance was increasing with 
payment surpluses. In particular, disaggregating the payment levels discloses the 
performance to be gradually increasing with the payment amount, when the tree 
survival increases by 2.31 trees (insignificant) for payments of the second quantile, by 
3.86 trees (at p<0.05) for payments of the third quantile, and by 3.31 trees (at p<0.05) 
for payments of the fourth quantile (Table 14).  
Table 14 Tree survival and payments 
 (1) OLS  
Conservation payment   
Payment in units of 10,000 KSh -  
Payment in quantiles   
  1st quantile (up to 12,000 KSh)   
  2nd quantile (above 12,000 - 18,000 KSh) 2.313 (1.625) 
  3rd quantile (above 18,000 - 20,000 KSh) 3.862* (1.753) 
  4th quantile (above 20,000 KSh) 3.310* (1.673) 
Treatment & Gender   
Action-based treatment (0/1) 0.156 (1.121) 
Male (0/1) 1.886+ (1.087) 
Opportunity costs characteristics   
Income & Land   
Total yearly income (in log) 0.823 (0.627) 
Subsistence farm (0/1) 1.097 (1.226) 
Total land (acres) -0.342 (0.278) 
Labor & Technology   
Stated labor constrains (0/1) -0.300 (1.193) 
Irrigation technology (0/1) 2.321 (1.770) 
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Personal characteristics   
Age (years) -0.014 (0.050) 
Education (years) -0.247+ (0.146) 
Group participation (0/1) 2.133 (1.415) 
Organization involvement (0/1) 0.545 (1.005) 
General satisfaction (0-3) -0.335 (0.738) 
Risk attitudes (0-10) -0.107 (0.220) 
Trust to locals (0-3) -0.171 (0.697) 
Discount rate (0-2) 0.643 (0.612) 
Constant 14.459+ (8.043) 
Observations 95  
Wald chi-squared 26.71+  
R-squared 0.311  
Adjusted R-squared 0.148  
Notes: (1) OLS regression of the number of surviving trees on the conservation payment levels (in quantiles), the 
treatment type and gender, and opportunity costs and personal characteristics. Bootstrapped VCE errors (1,000 
replications) are in parentheses. P-values: + p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. The contract payment is 
categorized into four quantiles, which are denoted by the 25th, the 50th (i.e. median), and the 75th percentiles. Two 
observations were dropped from the analyses due to flood damage (with 19 and 30 trees swept away), and one 
respondent did not provide answer on risk attitudes; resulting in 95 observations. The counterfactual for action-
based treatment is outcome-based treatment. For description of variables see Table 5. 
Further, the OLS regression results remain consistent when accounting for the count 
nature of the outcome variable (Table 15: column 1), and censoring for the maximum 
number of trees (Table 15: column 2).20 Overall, given the very small variation in the 
tree survivals, with standard deviation of 5.05 trees, the magnitudes of the above 
revealed significant effects are fairly high. With respect to the main hypothesis, I 
conclude that the outcome-based approach did not result into higher environmental 
performance than the action-based contracts.  
  
                                                        
20 Given the significant over-dispersion in the data (Likelihood-ratio test of alpha=0: p=0.027), I select the negative 
binomial regression that accommodates the non-linearity of the count data and relaxes the assumption of equal 
variance of the Poisson regression (Long & Freese, 2006). 
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Table 15 Negative binomial and censored regressions 
 
(1) NB 
  
Marginal 
effects 
(2) Tobit 
  
Conservation payment      
Payment in units of 10,000 KSh 0.086* (0.044) 2.185 2.173+ (1.189) 
Treatment & Gender      
Action-based treatment (0/1) -0.002 (0.038) -0.060 -0.272 (1.210) 
Male (0/1) 0.080* (0.036) 2.035 2.394* (1.132) 
Opportunity costs characteristics      
Income & Land      
Total yearly income (in log) 0.028 (0.021) 0.707 1.063 (0.696) 
Subsistence farm (0/1) 0.055 (0.043) 1.384 1.270 (1.325) 
Total land (acres) -0.014 (0.009) -0.349 -0.450 (0.304) 
Labor & Technology      
Stated labor constrains (0/1) -0.015 (0.041) -0.385 -0.258 (1.285) 
Irrigation equipment (0/1) 0.073 (0.056) 1.839 2.886 (2.232) 
Personal characteristics       
Age (years) -0.001 (0.002) -0.014 -0.004 (0.057) 
Education (years) -0.010* (0.005) -0.258 -0.296+ (0.169) 
Group participation (0/1) 0.100+ (0.055) 2.527 2.514 (1.551) 
Organization involvement (0/1) 0.018 (0.036) 0.452 0.918 (1.182) 
General satisfaction (0-3) -0.007 (0.026) -0.180 0.021 (0.748) 
Risk attitudes (0-10) -0.003 (0.008) -0.086 -0.185 (0.269) 
Trust to locals (0-3) 0.000 (0.022) -0.008 0.220 (0.754) 
Discount rate (0-2) 0.021 (0.021) 0.523 0.504 (0.680) 
Constant 2.775*** (0.258)  9.816 (8.807) 
Observations 95   95  
Wald chi-squared 30.87*   23.78+  
Pseudo R-squared -   0.063  
Notes: (1) Negative binomial regression of the number of surviving trees on the conservation payment, treatment 
type and gender, and the opportunity costs and personal characteristics. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
(2) Tobit regression of the number of surviving trees on the conservation payment, treatment type and gender, and 
the opportunity costs and personal characteristics. Right-censored at 30. Bootstrapped VCE errors (1,000 
replications) are in parentheses. P-values: + p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Two observations were 
dropped from the analyses due to flood damage (with 19 and 30 trees swept away), and one respondent did not 
provide answer on risk attitudes; resulting in 95 observations. The counterfactual for action-based treatment is 
outcome-based treatment. For description of variables see Table 5. 
  
55 
4.4. Tree care 
Summary statistics 
Using the evaluation survey I collected information on the tree care PES participants 
conducted during the contract period, which allows me to examine the hypothesis on 
the outcome-based approach to incentivize a choice of actions expected to lead to the 
desired outcome (incentive effect). Particularly, the PES participants were requested to 
specify the tree watering intensity, time spent on the tree care by seasons, and all 
activities performed to maintain the trees. 
In the dry season intensive tree watering was required under both contracts. 
Particularly, while under the action-based contract watering was necessary to comply 
with the requirement on keeping the soil moist, under the outcome-based contract 
watering was crucial for the tree seedlings to establish. Consequently, there was not 
much flexibility in how often to water the trees. This resulted in similar watering 
intensity, with 80 percent of participants under the action-based and 85 percent under 
the outcome-based contract watering the trees twice a day (Figure 10).  
Figure 10 Watering intensity by contract type 
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Given that intensive watering was required in the dry season, I collected separate data 
on tree care time for the dry and rainy seasons. The estimates confirm that the PES 
participants invested more labor in the dry season, and disclose only a little, 
statistically insignificant, variation between the two contract types in the dry season, 
and equal working hours in the rainy season.  
Table 16 Weekly time spent on tree care by seasons and contract types 
 
Obs. Mean Median Min Max 
(1) Hours a week in dry season       
Action-based contract 44 19.25 (10.31) 14 3 45 
Outcome-based contract 54 16.82 (8.89) 14 6 42 
(2) Hours a week in rainy season       
Action-based contract 44 6.36 (5.60) 4 0 24 
Outcome-based contract 54 6.02 (5.55) 4 0.5 28 
Notes: Summary statistics of weekly hours spent on tree care by the seasons and contract types. (1) Time in hours 
per week spent on the contract implementation in the dry season. (2) Time in hours per week spent on the contract 
implementation in the rainy season. Standard deviations are in parentheses. Difference in means using two-sample 
t-test with equal variances. P-values: + p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. 
Finally, the PES participants implemented on average four activities to maintain the 
trees, wherein the most common practices – in descending order - were: watering, 
weeding, fertilizing, guarding trees from damage by people and animals, and use of 
insecticides and pesticides (Table 17). 
Table 17 Tree care activities  
 N Percent 
Watering 98 100 
Weeding 88 90 
Fertilizing 79 81 
Guarding from people 64 65 
Guarding from animals 40 41 
Insecticides/Pesticides 38 39 
Notes: Tree care activities conducted during the contract period, sorted in descending order by the 
number of contract holders implementing the activity (denoted as N). The share out of 98 contract 
holders conducting the activity is indicated in percent. The activities were assessed using following 
question: Rank the most important activities that you have done to maintain the contract trees in 
the last six months. 
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Regression analysis  
First, regressing the time estimates for the dry season reveals that the time allocated to 
tree care increases with household’s income, and decreases with male gender, years of 
education, and prior exposure to a conservation organization. On the contrary, neither 
the contract type, nor the payments have revealed significant effects (Table 18: column 
1). At the same time, for the rainy season the variables are not jointly significant when 
predicting the tree care time (Table 18: column 2).  
Table 18 Weekly time spent on contract implementation by seasons 
 
(1) NB 
  
Marginal 
effects 
(2) NB 
  
Marginal 
effects 
Conservation payment       
Payment in units of 10,000 KSh 0.084 (0.096) 1.513 0.203 (0.135) 1.258 
Treatment & Gender       
Action-based treatment (0/1) 0.129 (0.101) 2.326 0.083 (0.170) 0.515 
Male (0/1) -0.177+ (0.103) -3.178 -0.192 (0.168) -1.191 
Opportunity costs characteristics       
Income & Land       
Total yearly income (in log) 0.176** (0.053) 3.157 0.054 (0.106) 0.336 
Subsistence farm (0/1) 0.013 (0.110) 0.234 0.197 (0.184) 1.218 
Total land (acres) -0.025 (0.018) -0.458 -0.068* (0.032) -0.420 
Labor & Technology       
Stated labor constrains (0/1) 0.103 (0.107) 1.846 -0.149 (0.162) -0.923 
Irrigation technology (0/1) 0.245 (0.168) 4.412 -0.107 (0.246) -0.664 
Personal characteristics        
Age (years) 0.001 (0.004) 0.012 -0.010 (0.020) -0.038 
Education (years) -0.037** (0.013) -0.660 -0.008 (0.021) -0.060  
Group participation (0/1) -0.086 (0.137) -1.549 0.199 (0.205) 1.235 
Organization involvement (0/1) -0.214* (0.104) -3.849 -0.443* (0.191) -2.744 
General satisfaction (0-3) 0.016 (0.049) 0.283 -0.028 (0.087) -0.175 
Risk attitudes (0-10) -0.001 (0.027) -0.008 0.005 (0.039) 0.028 
Trust to locals (0-3) -0.017 (0.057) -0.297 -0.088 (0.094) -0.542 
Discount rate (0-2) -0.042 (0.059) -0.763 0.042 (0.098) 0.262 
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Constant 1.141   1.586 (1.259)  
Observations 97   97   
Wald chi-squared 48.51***   22.03   
Notes: (1) Negative binomial regression of self-estimated time (in hours per week) spent on contract 
implementation in the dry season on the payment, treatment type and gender, and the household and personal 
characteristics. (2) Negative binomial regression of self-estimated time (in hours per week) spent on contract 
implementation in the rainy season on the payment, treatment type and gender, and the household and personal 
characteristics. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. P-values: + p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. The 
counterfactual for action-based treatment is outcome-based treatment. For description of variables see Table 5. 
Second, the treatment is the only variable consistently signed across the tree care 
activities, while gender and discount rate show consistent parameters for all but one 
activity. None of the other significant determinants were consistently signed, and 
therefore their interpretation is rather difficult. Further, since regular watering was 
prescribed for the action-based contracts as well as was crucial for the tree survivals, 
there was no significant difference in the watering intensity by the contract type or 
gender (Table 19). 
Consequently, the outcome-based contract holders were more likely to implement the 
entire tree caring practices additional to watering, which is consistent with the 
theoretical prediction on the outcome-based approach to enhance choice of actions 
that is expected to achieve the desired environmental performance. The indifferent 
tree survivals between the action- and outcome-based contracts, however, suggest that 
the incentive effect did not translate into a better performance.  
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Table 19 Conservation activities 
 
(1) Probit 
Watering 
(2) Probit 
Weeding 
(3) Probit 
Fertilizing 
(4) Probit 
Guarding 
(5) Probit 
Insect/Pest. 
Treatment & Gender       
Action-based treatment (0/1) -0.513 -0.947+ -0.801* -1.359*** -0.604* 
 
(0.351) (0.512) (0.380) (0.323) (0.295) 
Male (0/1) -0.094 -1.963*** -0.712* -0.341 0.311 
 (0.364) (0.510) (0.362) (0.311) (0.299) 
Opportunity costs characteristics      
Income & Land      
Total yearly income (in log) 1.013*** -0.773* 0.602* -0.579** 0.065 
 
(0.267) (0.376) (0.298) (0.195) (0.179) 
Subsistence farm (0/1) -0.410 1.506+ -0.491 -0.837* -0.442 
 (0.377) (0.788) (0.349) (0.342) (0.335) 
Total land (acres) 0.028 0.239* 0.114 -0.062 0.033 
 (0.065) (0.099) (0.114) (0.071) (0.068) 
Labor & Technology      
Stated labor constrains (0/1) 0.322 -0.044 0.294 0.313 0.906** 
 (0.404) (0.502) (0.378) (0.291) (0.314) 
Irrigation technology (0/1) -1.121* -1.259+ 1.955** 0.665 1.134* 
 (0.533) (0.643) (0.620) (0.540) (0.486) 
Personal characteristics       
Age (years) 0.026+ 0.031 -0.008 0.002 -0.028* 
 (0.015) (0.021) (0.015) (0.013) (0.013) 
Education (years) -0.115+ -0.020 0.088+ 0.046 -0.038 
 (0.060) (0.059) (0.046) (0.039) (0.036) 
Group participation (0/1) -0.723 1.238* -0.189 0.147 -0.291 
 (0.449) (0.626) (0.404) (0.384) (0.390) 
Organization involvement (0/1) 0.098 0.666 -0.104 0.521 0.534+ 
 (0.429) (0.509) (0.386) (0.343) (0.304) 
General life satisfaction (0-3) 0.516** 0.546* -0.490** -0.152 -0.212 
 (0.197) (0.269) (0.188) (0.170) (0.170) 
Risk attitudes (0-10) 0.141 0.104 -0.094 -0.096 0.037 
 (0.094) (0.102) (0.093) (0.070) (0.073) 
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Trust to locals (0-3) -0.376 0.171 0.400 -0.257 -0.262 
 (0.240) (0.328) (0.246) (0.183) (0.189) 
Discount rate (0-2) -0.377 -0.910* -0.475* -0.076 0.031 
 (0.275) (0.365) (0.235) (0.184) (0.190) 
Constant -10.314** 8.962* -4.513 7.757** 0.632 
 (3.008) (4.262) (3.533) (2.536) (2.320) 
Observations 97 97 97 97 97 
Wald chi-squared 32.95** 35.44** 33.43** 29.32* 30.22* 
Pseudo R-squared 0.345 0.469 0.307 0.225 0.223 
Notes: (1) Probit regression with the binary conduct of intense watering (1-twice a day, 0-less than twice a day) as 
the outcome variable, and the treatment, gender, and opportunity costs and personal characteristics as explanatory 
variables. (2) Probit regression with the binary conduct of weeding as the outcome variable, and the treatment, 
gender, and opportunity costs and personal characteristics as explanatory variables. (3) Probit regression with the 
binary conduct of fertilizing as the outcome variable, and the treatment, gender, and opportunity costs and personal 
characteristics as explanatory variables. (4) Probit regression with the binary conduct of guarding from animals as 
the outcome variable, and the treatment, gender, and opportunity costs and personal characteristics as explanatory 
variables. (5) Probit regression with the binary conduct of use of insecticides or pesticides as the outcome variable, 
and the treatment, gender, and opportunity costs and personal characteristics as explanatory variables. Robust 
standard errors are in parentheses. P-values: + p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Dummy variables are 
described as (0/1), with “no” coded as 0, and “yes” coded as 1. The range for categorical variables is provided in 
parentheses. For description of variables see Table 5. The regression model explaining the variation in the conduct 
of guarding trees from people was not statistically significant. 
In this regard, I could prove a significant association between the tree survivals and the 
watering intensity in the action-based treatment where monitoring data is available. 
Particularly, I found between 0.49 and 0.65 more trees surviving with one more tree 
watered in the first monitoring round (Table 20: columns 1-2), and between 0.29 and 
0.33 more trees surviving with one more tree watered in the second monitoring round 
(Table 20: columns 3-4).  
This suggests that watering was the main action ensuring the tree survivals, which - 
given the indifferent watering intensity between the contract types – might explain 
why the differences in the additional tree care did not translate into different tree 
survivals. At the same time, the extent to which all contract holders implemented a 
wide range of tree care activities is in the contradiction to the expectation that 
participants under action-based contracts solely meet the contract requirements 
(Matzdorf & Lorenz, 2010; Zabel & Holm-Müller, 2008). 
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Table 20 Tree survival and watering compliance under action-based contract 
 
(1) OLS 
 
(2) Marginal 
effect (NB) 
(3) OLS 
 
(4) Marginal 
effect (NB) 
No. of watered trees in:     
1st monitoring round 0.494* 0.651* - - 
 (0.201) (0.330)   
2nd monitoring round - - 0.289** 0.329* 
   (0.098) (0.128) 
Constant 11.184+ - 18.098*** - 
 (5.997)  (2.897)  
Observations 44 44 44 44 
F-statistics/Wald chi-squared 6.05* 3.73+ 8.67** 6.03* 
R-squared 0.268 - 0.369 - 
Adjusted R-squared 0.250 - 0.354 - 
Notes: (1) OLS regression of the number of surviving trees on the number of watered trees in the first 
monitoring round (2) Marginal effect of negative binomial (NB) regression regressing the number of surviving 
trees on the number of watered trees in the first monitoring round. (3) OLS regression of the number of 
surviving trees on the number of watered trees in the second monitoring round (4) Marginal effect of negative 
binomial (NB) regression regressing the number of surviving trees on the number of watered trees in the second 
monitoring round. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. P-values: + p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01,  
*** p<0.001.  
4.5. Intrinsic motivation  
The concept of payments for environmental services is based on a voluntary conduct, 
which can be differentiated on the basis of extrinsic and intrinsic motivation. Extrinsic 
motivation then refers to the payment to incentivize the compliance with the 
conservation contract, and intrinsic motivation to the inner commitment to the 
environmental outcome. In this context, the outcome-based approach compared to the 
action-based payments is expected to enhance intrinsic motivation (Matzdorf & 
Lorenz, 2010). This is an open-ended discussion when I present some thoughts on the 
roles of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation, and potential differences in motivations 
between the contract types.  
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First, I suggest that the high environmental performance under the two PES schemes 
might result from the design of contracts, when the action-based contracts required 
intensive watering that was significantly associated with tree survivals, and the 
outcome-based contracts paid according to the number of surviving trees. In this 
respect, I was interested whether under the action-based treatment the trees were 
watered for the sake of monitoring, which would indicate extrinsic rather than intrinsic 
motivation.  
Indeed, I found that the compliance with the watering requirement significantly 
dropped after the first monitoring. In this regard, it is important to mention that the 
farmers expected the first monitoring with high probability, whilst the timing of the 
second monitoring was rather surprising for them. Thus, the significant decrease by 
3.84 trees in the number of the watered trees in the second monitoring round shows 
that the compliance under the action-based contracts was decreasing with decrease in 
the expected probability of monitoring.21 Moreover, regressing the monitoring results 
on the conservation payment reveals increase in the number of watered trees between 
3.3 and 3.4 trees in the first monitoring round (Table 21: columns 1-2), and between 
10.6 and 13.4 trees in the second monitoring round (Table 21: columns 3-4), for 
10,000 KSh increase in the payment. Hence, the contract compliance being increasing 
with the payment amounts also indicates on external motivation under the action-
based contracts.  
  
                                                        
21 Paired t-test of numbers of watered trees, out of 30, in the first and second monitoring rounds: difference=3.84; 
p=0.019; n=44. 
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Table 21 Watering compliance under action-based contracts 
 
(1) OLS 
 
(2) Marginal 
effect (NB) 
(3) OLS 
 
(4) Marginal 
effect (NB) 
 1st monitoring round 2nd monitoring round 
Conservation payment     
Payment in units of 10,000 KSh 3.329+ 3.374+ 10.612*** 13.373** 
 (1.819) (1.930) (2.655) (5.141) 
Constant 23.316*** - 8.529 - 
 (3.498)  (5.239)  
Observations 44 44 44 44 
F-statistics/Wald chi-squared 3.35+ 2.79+ 15.98*** 5.82* 
R-squared 0.114 - 0.289 - 
Adjusted R-squared 0.093 - 0.272 - 
Notes: (1) OLS regression of the number of watered trees in the first monitoring round on the conservation 
payment (in units of 10,000 KSh). (2) Marginal effect of negative binomial regression regressing the number of 
watered trees in the first monitoring round on the conservation payment (in units of 10,000 KSh). (3) OLS 
regression of the number of watered trees in the second monitoring round on the conservation payment (in 
units of 10,000 KSh). (4) Marginal effect of negative binomial regression regressing the number of watered trees 
in the second monitoring round on the conservation payment (in units of 10,000 KSh). Robust standard errors 
are in parentheses. P-values: + p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Controlling for the other variables (for 
description of the variables see Table 5) does not change the payment variable parameters. 
At the same time, the tree care assessment disclosed landholders with result-oriented 
contracts to be more likely to conduct tree-care activities additional to watering. This, 
together with the above evidence on watering requirement compliance seems to 
indicate that the outcome-based compared to the action-based contract indeed 
enhanced intrinsic motivation towards tree survivals. However, though the extent of 
the implementation was significantly lower compared to the outcome-based treatment, 
the landholders with action-based contracts did not just follow the contract 
requirement on keeping the soil around the trees moist, but also them conducted 
weeding and fertilizing, guarded trees from people and animals, and applied 
insecticides and pesticides. Also, the specified motivation of more than half of action-
based farmers to care for seedlings was based on tree survival, and not soil moisture 
and the payment alone (Table 22). This, actually, suggests that also the action-based 
contract holders were to some extent aiming at tree survivals.  
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Further, the finding on the environmental performance being increasing with payment 
surpluses indicates that the payments, in general, provided incentive for better care 
taking. At the same time, however, a number of low payments also resulted in high tree 
survivals (Figure 11).  
Figure 11 Contract payments and tree survivals 
 
This lets me hypothesize that the low cost participants might be either intrinsically 
motivated, or might expect future tree benefits, which would refer to rather extrinsic 
motivation. Regarding the latter, the evaluation survey reveals participants being 
largely satisfied with the tree species (94 percent), and all being expecting tree benefits 
such as firewood, fodder or leaves for mulching. There are, however, time lags between 
planting the trees and the benefit provision, when the participants expected some 
benefits and substantial benefits in five and ten years from the project start. 
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Table 22 Responses to questions assessing intrinsic motivation  
 Targeted farmers (n=411), 
Affirmative answers 
More trees lead to a better water quality 378 (92.0%) 
More trees increase the water quantity 392 (95.4%) 
Conservation plays an important role in the society 405 (98.5%) 
I feel obliged to conserve the environment  389 (94.6%) 
I am willing to protect water in my area 408 (99.3%) 
People in this area are generally concerned with 
conservation 
287 (69.8%) 
Farming at the riparian banks affects water quality  320 (77.9%) 
My water quality is affected by activities of people 
upstream 
322 (78.3%) 
There is a relationship between my farming activities 
and the water quality in the area 
240 (58.4%) 
 Contracted farmers (n=98) 
Farmers who ‘very much agreed’a 
 
 Action-based 
(n=44) 
Outcome-based 
(n=54) 
A good farmer cares for plants on his farm 37 (84.1%)  47 (87.0%) 
I feel obliged to plant a tree once receiving a seedling 38 (86.4%)  49 (90.7%) 
I feel obliged to take good care of a tree once planted 40 (90.9%) 50 (92.6%) 
Planting trees is a responsibility 34 (77.3%) 48 (88.9%) 
The importance of tree planting increased with being 
selected in a competitive tender 
35 (79.5%) 37 (68.5%) 
The importance of tree planting increased with the 
signing of a contract 
29 (65.9%) 38 (70.4%) 
How would you feel about a tree you planted dying: 
i. nothing, ii. disappointed (incurred cost), iii. sad? 
i. 0, ii. 21 (47.7%),  
iii. 23 (52.3%) 
i. 0, ii. 27 (50%),  
iii.27 (50%) 
Did you aim at i. tree survival, ii. moist soil, or iii. both 
i. and ii.? 
i. 26 (59.1%), ii. 1 (2.3%), 
iii. 17 (38.6%) 
- 
What was your main motivation for tree watering:  
i. tree survival, ii. payment, iii. both? 
i. 25 (56.8%), ii.0,  
iii. 18 (40.9%), 1 missing  
- 
a The questions used a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 corresponds to “I agree very much” and 5 to “I very much disagree”. 
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With respect to the former suggestion on the PES participants being intrinsically 
motivated, the targeted population and the contract holders indeed showed high 
intrinsic motivation towards conservation and trees. Environmental awareness and 
general willingness to contribute to conservation was very high, with values close to 
100 percent. The awareness slightly drops to 78 percent when it comes to farming 
effects along the river bank on water in general, and further falls to 58 percent when 
prompted to judge one’s own farming effects on water. In addition, the auction 
allocation mechanism and the contract signing procedure appear to increase the PES 
participants´ motivation towards tree planting. In particular, between 74 percent and 
68 percent of participants very much agreed that the importance of tree planting was 
increased by being selected in a competitive tender and by the signing of a contract, as 
opposed to a situation without a tender or contract (Table 22). 
Moreover, the participants showed largely satisfaction with the participation in the 
tree planting project, wherein 75 percent appreciated the participation in the field trial 
due to gain of knowledge on tree benefits and skills on tree planting and management, 
while other appreciated the project participation to establish a sense for responsibility, 
commitment and time planning.22 Also, 80 percent of the participants were trusting 
they would receive the payment.23 For comparison, only 9 percent of the participants 
stated that people could be generally trusted. Yet the participants’ statements indicate 
that the PES schemes could promote intrinsic motivation, 61 percent of the contract 
holders still stated that without the payment most people would not perform tree care 
as the contracts required.24  
Finally, though the landholders were not obliged to keep the planted trees after the 
PES scheme end, I discovered average survival rates of 20.6 trees, and median of 22 
                                                        
22 The question was open, asking, „What lessons did you learn from the project?“ 
23 How much did you trust that you would receive the payment for tree planting after the six month period? 
Answers on a scale between 1 and 5, when 1 denotes trusted very much and 5 is did not trust at all. 
24 Do you agree or disagree that most people would breach the conservation contract, that is would not be fulfilling 
the requirements, if there were no payment? Answers on a scale between 1 and 5, when 1 denotes agree very 
much and 5 disagree very much.  
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trees, by the tree survivals assessment one year after the project end, in August 2013. 
These are about five trees less, compared to the tree survivals in June 2012, without 
significant difference between the former treatments.25 The high survivals show on 
continuous care taking for the planted trees after the one-shot conservation payments. 
According to the interviewed farmers they expected long-term tree benefits, but also 
generally took more care of trees since their participation in the PES scheme. The 
continuity results thus suggest that while the conservation payments helped to 
overcome the initial costs of the most labor intensive phase, the participants continued 
with the tree care after the six months period, being driven by expected tree benefits 
and enhanced intrinsic motivation. 
4.6. Discussion and conclusion 
The hypothesis on the outcome-based approach to achieve better environmental 
performance could not be confirmed, with the tree survivals being statistically 
undistinguishable for the action-based and outcome-based contracts. On the other 
hand, the field trial disclosed participant´s gender, education, group participation, and 
the payment amount to impact the tree survivals.  
In this regard, the significant association between the tree survivals and payments 
provides supporting evidence on the argumentation that decreasing the gap between 
informational rents and true opportunity costs might negatively affect the 
environmental performance, as suggested in the PES literature. The negative effect of 
education might be possibly clarified by the opportunity costs being increasing with 
the education level. Social network benefits in terms of labor sharing and conflict 
prevention might then perhaps explain the positive effect of group participation. The 
gender effects are discussed in Chapter 5. 
Further, I found the type of contract to play a role in defining tree care, with outcome-
based contract holders being more likely to conduct entire care taking actions, 
                                                        
25 Two-sample t-test with equal variances (p=0.300). 
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conducted in addition to watering. Thus, I could confirm the hypothesis that the 
outcome-based treatment has incentivized a choice of activities that is expected to lead 
to the desired outcome. Nevertheless, the observed additional tree care under 
outcome-based contract holders did not translate into higher tree survivals. In this 
respect, I found the watering intensity under the action-based contracts to be 
positively correlated with the tree survivals, which leads me to speculate that, given 
the indifferent watering intensity between the contract types, the treatment difference 
in the additional tree care alone could not significantly influence the environmental 
performance. Perhaps, if formulating the watering requirement as less demanding I 
might find more variation in the tree survivals of the action-based contracts.  
Finally, the considerations on intrinsic and extrinsic motivations are end-open. The 
farmers clearly had intrinsic motivation from the outset of the study; however 
surpluses in the conservation payments led to higher tree survivals and higher 
compliance with the watering requirement. Monitoring also played a crucial role in the 
watering intensity under action-based contracts. High performance of participants who 
received low payments and the continuity results might refer to intrinsic motivation 
and/or expected future tree benefits. 
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5. Action- and outcome-based payments for environmental services: 
Gender aspects in tree planting contracts in Kenya 
5.1. Objectives and hypotheses 
In the foregoing bid and tree survivals analyses statistically significant gender effects 
were revealed. Hence, I can fully confirm the fifth hypothesis of the dissertation on 
participant´s gender to impact 
PES schemes in terms of 
willingness to accept and 
environmental performance. 
The main aim of this chapter is 
to examine gender roles and 
attitudes, and their implications 
in the implementation of action-
based and outcome-based PES 
schemes. 
 
 
Based on the above evidence (Chapters 3 & 4) I confirm the fifth hypothesis: 
5. Participant´s gender impacts PES schemes in terms of willingness to accept 
and environmental performance.  
In this chapter I examine the last sixth hypothesis of the dissertation: 
6. There is a relationship between gender impacts on PES and gender roles and 
attitudes.  
  
Notes: Former contract holder with a project 
tree. September 2013, one year after the 
project end. 
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5.2. Conceptual framework 
I adapted the “Gender Box” framework of Colfer & Minarchek (2013) to analyze gender 
aspects that I consider of importance with respect to the implementation of PES 
schemes. The framework was originally developed for identifying gender issues 
relevant to forestry, assigning them to macro, meso, or micro scale. The scales are 
rather flexible when each issue has some relevance across all scales, while the micro-
level is considered as the most powerful in determining the main drivers.  
The data of my study predominantly refer to the micro scale. At the meso and macro 
scale, I compare my findings to other regions in Kenya and Sub-Saharan Africa. I did 
not analyze all the listed factors, but rather focus on those, which I consider most 
relevant for the tree planting PES schemes. Additionally, as I deal with conservation 
payments and thus, economic decisions, I add risk attitudes to the relevant factors at 
the micro scale (Table 23).  
Table 23 Framework for analyzing gender implications in PES schemes 
Gender-specific factors that might impact PES schemes 
Macro scale (global to national level) 
Laws & policies (e.g. conservation, rural development & land tenure)  
Cultural & religious trends  
Meso scale (regional to landscape level) 
Resource allocation (e.g. customary land and tree tenure, inheritance & residence) 
Norms of behavior in conservation, forestry & agriculture 
 Access to education & trainings 
Importance of cash activities (e.g. cash crops, salaried work & remittances) 
 Micro scale (village/community to intra-household level) 
Intra-household decision-making and power dynamics (also in terms of conservation, forestry & agriculture) 
Labor division (also in terms of conservation, forestry & agriculture) 
Economic roles & Risk attitudes 
Demographic issues (e.g. migration, population changes & density) 
Alternative economic strategies (e.g. livelihood diversification, time constrains & distribution of benefits) 
Notes: The framework is adapted from Colfer & Minarchek (2013: p. 412-413, Tables I & II). 
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5.3. Results 
5.4. Gender and conservation auction  
I proved gender to significantly impact the willingness to accept in conservation 
auctions, and the effects to differ for the action-based and outcome-based contract 
types. In particular, I found (i) women to submit 23 percent lower bids in the action-
based versus outcome-based treatment, and conversely 30 percent higher bids in the 
outcome-based versus action-based treatment, whilst men did not react differently to 
the two treatments. In addition, there was (ii) a statistically significant decrease of 36 
percent in women´s versus men´s bids, or conversely an increase of 55 percent in 
men´s versus women´s bids, in the action-based treatment (Chapter 3). 
Using the gender-disaggregated data analysis, I examine the relationship between the 
revealed gendered treatment effect on bids and risk behavior of men and women, and 
subsequently explore potential links between the gender differences in bids and 
gender roles. 
Risk attitudes 
I elicited risk behavior of the targeted population using a general risk question “Are 
you generally a person who is fully prepared to take risks, or do you try to avoid taking 
risks?” and providing a scale between 0 and 10, where the value 0 means “unwilling to 
take risks” and the value 10 means “fully prepared to take risks”. In the conservation 
auctions (Table 5) the bids were increasing with increasing risk seeking, which is in 
accordance with the theoretical prediction that risk averse participants lower their 
bids in order to increase the probability of winning a conservation contract. 
Particularly, the rationale behind is that the conservation payment decreases 
landholders´ income uncertainty (Latacz-Lohmann & Van der Hamsvoort, 1997).  
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Further, given that the randomized treatment assignment allows for isolation of the 
effect of the contract type on the bidding behavior, the significant increase in female 
bids in the outcome-based compared to action-based treatment leads me to 
hypothesize that women in contrast to men have requested risk premiums. This is in 
line with the arguments that the adoption of agroforestry and other investment 
opportunities reflects gendered differences in exposure to and perceptions of risk 
(Villamor et al., 2014b), and that “men and women may differ in their willingness to 
assume risks with respect to the provision of ecosystem services” (Villamor & van 
Noordwijk, 2016; p. 77). 
However, the elicited risk behavior does not reveal women being more risk averse than 
men.26 This is not only untypical for a development country setting, but also means 
that the higher aversion of women to the outcome-based approach was not predicted 
by the elicited risk attitudes. This is consistent with the study of Dohmen et al. (2011) 
who found the general risk question as the best overall predictor, but proposes that 
context specific questions might provide better measures on risk attitudes within their 
particular domain. In this case it would imply to additionally examine specific risk 
questions concerning the outcome-based approach.  
Gender roles 
I explore the intra-household decision-making, labor division, and income generation 
of the target population in order to provide answer on the ways traditional gender 
roles might impact the conservation auctions, and PES schemes in general.  
The baseline survey revealed men to be traditionally perceived as the household head. 
In 20 percent of the surveyed households, women assumed headship, mostly due to 
husband´s urban labor migration or their status as widowers. The shift in headship is 
even more remarkable in Western Kenya, but also other African countries such as 
Zimbabwe, where over fifty percent of the households were found to be female-headed 
                                                        
26 Multinomial logistic regression of general risk attitudes (scale 0-10) on gender (n=407). 
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(Kiptot & Franzel, 2011). Land tenure in the study area is also associated with the male 
household representatives (Bedru et al., 2011). This shows that even if the 2010 
adopted Constitution of Kenya eliminated gender discrimination related to land and 
property in land,27 traditional rules still prevent women from possession of land. 
Expressing it in the terminology of Colfer & Minarchek (2013), a change at the macro 
level has not (yet) been translated into changes at the micro level. A similar situation is 
reported in Tanzania where by law, men and women are granted equal land ownership 
and inheritance rights, nevertheless customary laws still exclude women (Kiptot et al., 
2014).  
More importantly, men hold exclusive rights in high value sectors. Particularly, men 
are the main decision-takers and payout recipients from cash crops (UTaNRMP/IFADb, 
2012). Further, the intra-household analysis - of male-headed households - shows that 
men are also dominant in the tree management, being the only decision-takers in 50 
percent of households, as opposed to 15 percent for women (Table 24). In this regard, 
exotic tree species of high economic value such as Eucalyptus and Grevillea robusta 
dominate in the study area (Hoang et al., 2014; UTaNRMP/IFAD, 2012a). Consequently, 
the men´s authority over tea and coffee production and tree management matches 
studies across Africa that show men´s concentration on the wholesale trade and high-
value crop trees such as cocoa, coffee, and oil palm (Kiptot & Franzel, 2011; Rocheleau 
& Edmunds, 1997). Moreover, with respect to the men´s dominance in tree 
management, cultural beliefs might additionally prevent women from tree planting 
(Kiptot & Franzel, 2011; Franzel et al., 2007). 
Similarly, the observed dominance of women in subsistence farming is also consistent 
with other studies from Sub-Sahara Africa (Kiptot & Franzel, 2011; Meijer et al., 2015; 
Rocheleau & Edmunds, 1997), wherein I find women to have greater stakes than men 
in decisions related to harvesting, weeding, and crop consumption. At the same time, 
men more frequently make individual decisions on the purchase of inputs and 
                                                        
27  Constitution of Kenya, 2010. Chapter 5-Land and Environment. Part 1 – Land. 60(1): (f). 
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children´s education while gender roles are balanced in decisions on what crops to 
plant, whether to hire labor, what produce to sell, on overall household´s expenses and 
savings, and on caretaking for relatives (Table 24). 
Table 24 Intra-household decision-making in male-headed households 
 Male only Female only Jointly N 
Agricultural production & Farm labor     
Crops to plant 27 27 46 327 
Crop harvest 15 32 53 325 
Weeding 13 37 50 327 
Mulching  22 28 50 237 
Labor to hire 26 28 46 275 
Tree management     
Trees to plant 50 15 35 315 
Tree pruning 50 18 32 291 
Resource allocation & Produce marketing      
Household expenses & savings  21 21 58 322 
Inputs to purchase 33 17 50 324 
Farm produce to sell 25 25 50 317 
Farm produce to keep for consumption 17 35 48 316 
Family care     
Children´s education 37 11 52 246 
Caretaking of relatives 15 18 67 272 
Notes: The table is based on the following question from the baseline survey: Who among the household members 
serves as the decision-maker for the following activities, and who performs the activities? The gender roles were 
assessed from following options: (i) Male household member only, (ii) Female household member only, (iii) Both 
male and female household members. The figures in the table are indicated in percent, that is of the number of 
households taking decisions on the activity (denoted as N), what was the share in percent conducted solely by men 
(denoted as male only), solely by women (denoted as female only), or jointly by men and women (denoted as 
jointly). Female-headed households (N=82) are excluded from the analysis, resulting in the total number of 327 
observations.  
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Further, the labor division and resource allocation - in male-headed households - to a 
great extent reflect the decision-making roles, wherein men invest most labor in tree 
management, and joint and women´s labor dominate in food crop production. 
Similarly, men are more frequently responsible for the purchase of inputs, and 
assisting children with school. On the other hand, whereas labor hiring and conduct of 
household expenditures remain a joint task, in several areas of joint and men´s 
decision-making women invest more labor than men. In particular, while there is joint 
decision-making on marketing produce, it is the women who are mainly selling the 
produce to the market. Further, although decisions on caretaking of relatives are taken 
jointly, more women than men do assume the responsibility (Table 25). Similarly, 
while men dispose over decision rights and earnings from the cash crops, women are 
the main collectors of tea leaves and coffee beans (UTaNRMP/IFAD, 2012b).  
The findings concur with the literature showing that although women perform most of 
the labor in agricultural production, women have limited rights over produce, are 
prevented from decision-making on cash crops, and normally have obligations to 
provide labor for male controlled fields while there is no reciprocal responsibility for 
the men (Kiptot & Franzel, 2011; Kiptot et al., 2014). Simultaneously, a special case 
represents households where women assumed headship, wherein a separate analysis 
of female-headed households shows that women, in the absence of their husbands, 
additionally perform the men´s tasks; and that despite of 80 percent of the female-
headed households do include male representatives, being it adult sons or other 
relatives. 
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Table 25 Labor division and resource allocation in male-headed households 
 Male only Female only Jointly N 
Agricultural production & Farm labor     
Planting crops 14 37 49 309 
Harvesting crops 14 37 49 308 
Weeding 13 44 43 307 
Mulching  20 38 42 218 
Hiring of labor 35 35 30 267 
Tree management     
Planting trees 48 20 32 301 
Pruning trees 57 18 25 264 
Resource allocation & Produce marketing      
Making expenditures  22 26 52 317 
Inputs purchase and use 42 28 30 318 
Farm produce retailing 24 46 30 312 
Family care     
Assisting children with school performance  43 21 36 244 
Caregiving to relatives 11 34 55 268 
Notes: For details on the assessment see notes of Table 24. The number of the observations (demoted as N) shows 
the number of households performing the activity. Female-headed households (N=82) are excluded from the 
analysis, resulting in the total number of 327 observations.  
Next, the comparison of the household´s income shares generated by men and women 
reveals that traditionally men are the key earner in the household, while women 
assume the main income generation role only in the absence of the husband. 
Specifically, men represented the main cash income generator, contributing over 60 
percent of the household´s main income, in 45 percent of the targeted households; 
while the women that mainly contribute to household’s income accounts to 35 percent 
of the households. Moreover, considering the male-headed households only, the 
proportion of women who provide most of the household´s income further drops from 
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35 to 20 percent, and accordingly, the share of men being the main earner increases 
from 45 to 55 percent. In the remaining households, both male and female household´s 
representatives contributed between 41 and 59 percent to the main income.  
In total, men on average generated about 20 percent more income than women, or 
women contributed 17 percent less to household´s income than men (Table 26: column 
1). Again, excluding the female-headed households from the analysis, the gender gap 
becomes much more remarkable, with 75 percent increase in men´s versus women´s 
income, or conversely, 43 percent decrease in women´s versus men´s income (Table 
26: column 2). The gendered incomes are consistent with the above evidence that men 
hold rights in the upper end of the value chain, in that, the female dominated food crop 
sector yields significantly lower incomes, compared to the men-controlled cash crop 
and timber production. 
Further, yet women´s income in female-headed households almost double compared to 
women in male-headed households (Table 26: column 3), overall, male-headed 
households still generate 45 percent more income than households with female heads. 
This shows that despite women’s assumption of income-generating activities due to 
absence of men, they could not fully earn the same level of income as men, suggesting 
that female-headed households are especially cash constrained. In this regard, in our 
study 20 percent of the targeted households were female headed, and 21 percent of the 
auction participants and 18 percent of the contract holders were women who assumed 
household´s headship.  
Moreover, men´s income sources were far more diversified, when over 30 percent of 
men derived their income from business and salaried work that generate up to 50 
percent higher incomes compared to the female dominated crop production. 
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Table 26 Gendered incomes 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 All households Male-headed  Female-headed 
Male 71,827 (6,336) 89,399 (7,619) 1,752 (1,006) 
Female 59,857 (6,074) 51,066 (6,535) 94,914 (14,912) 
Difference 11,970+ (6,607) 38,333*** (6,599) -93,162*** (15,071) 
N 409  327  82  
Notes: (1) Means of main household´s income in KSh generated by men and women for all surveyed households.  
(2) Means of main household´s income in KSh generated by men and women in male-headed households. (3) Means 
of main household´s income in KSh generated by men and women in female-headed households. Standard errors are 
in parentheses. Differences in means using paired t-test. + p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. The analysis is 
based on following survey questions: (i) What is the household´s total yearly gross income in KSh? (ii) What is the 
percentage of the main income on the total household´s income? (iii) Indicate in percentages how much of the 
household´s main income is earned by (a) male (b) female (c) both. 
From the foregoing discussion I hypothesize on two potential drivers of the gender 
effects on bids. First, the gendered incomes suggest on lower returns to female labor. 
Consequently, as auction bids should be related to compliance costs, the lower female 
bids could be a result of lower opportunity costs of women. At the same time, however, 
the labor division analysis shows women to face higher labor constraints than men. In 
this regard, I posit a second complementary hypothesis that for women the cash 
income from conservation payments was of higher importance than for men. The 
reasoning beyond is that, as presented above, women compared to men face increased 
cash constrains and lack alternative income opportunities, which might lead them to 
reduce their bids in order to increase their chance of receiving the contract. 
The evaluation survey then provides additional supportive evidence on the latter 
hypothesis. First, most women alike men were willing to accept a tree planting contract 
at the same price again, showing women were satisfied with the received payments. 
Second, women more than men used the chance to decide alone on the use of the 
conservation payment, with 67 percent of men, but only 44 percent of women deciding 
jointly with their spouses. Third, for women the conservation payment represented 
more improvement in their livelihoods than for men. Particularly, 64 percent of 
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women, but only 51 percent of men stated the conservation payment “much” improved 
their livelihood, while for 36 percent of women and 44 percent of men the 
improvement was only “little”, and two men (5 percent) stated no improvement at all. 
Overall, this leads me to suggest that the gender roles impact opportunity costs and 
access to cash of men and women, and accordingly provided source of the gendered 
heterogeneity in bids. 
5.5. Gender and environmental performance 
The tree survival analysis proved men to achieve about 7 percent higher tree survivals 
than women (Chapter 4), wherein there were no significant differences in tree 
survivals between the treatments. Since in the study the natural conditions for tree 
planting were fairly equal, wherein the same mix of indigenous trees had to be planted 
on riparian land, I narrow my focus on the tree care as possible driver of the gendered 
differences in tree survivals. I explore first conservation knowledge of men and 
women, which I consider key for the tree care to translate into the desired 
environmental outcome, and continue with the assessment of the tree care provided by 
male and female PES participants.  
Conservation knowledge 
The baseline assessment of the conservation knowledge reaffirms tree planting as a 
predominantly male task, while men´s labor also prevails in erosion-abatement 
practices such as terraces building and grass strips planting. Similarly to tree planting, 
the men´s dominance over grass strips and napier grass might be explained by their 
commercial value as fodder (UTaNRMP/IFAD, 2012b). Women are then mainly 
conducting soil improvement practices such as crop rotation, cover cropping and 
mixed cropping, and use of drought resistant crops; thus confirming women´s 
prevalence in the food crop sector. Also, the traditional women´s responsibility for 
domestic water supply has been confirmed by their prevailing responsibility for roof 
water harvesting. The only practice conducted fairly equally by both male and female 
household members is contour ploughing (Table 27). 
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Table 27 Labor division for conservation practices in male-headed 
households 
 Male only Female only Jointly N 
Tree planting 48 18 34 297 
Erosion terracing 70 19 11 228 
Contour ploughing 37 31 32 132 
Grass strips 61 23 16 129 
Napier grass  44 26 30 308 
Crop rotation 19 42 39 203 
Cover cropping 22 54 24 140 
Mixed cropping 12 44 44 291 
Drought resistant crop 31 49 20 224 
Roof water harvest 26 61 13 174 
Notes: The table is based on the following question from the baseline survey: Do you practice any of the following 
soil and water conservation methods, and who is performing the methods? The gender roles were assessed from 
following options: (i) Conduct of the activity by the male household member only. (ii) Conduct of the activity by the 
female household member only. (iii) Joint conduct of the activity by both male and female household members. The 
figures in the table are indicated in percent, that is of the number of respondents practicing the activity (denoted as 
N), what was the share in percent conducted solely by men (denoted as male only), solely by women (denoted as 
female only), or jointly by men and women (denoted as jointly). Female-headed households (N=82) are excluded 
from the analysis, resulting in the total number of 327 observations.  
Therefore, gendered roles in conservation can be posited, which corroborates other 
study findings highlighting gendered decision-making as an important determinant of 
the adoption of tree planting and agroforestry technologies (Kiptot & Franzel, 2011; 
Meijer et al., 2015). Given that men were considered traditional decision-makers on 
trees, I addressed potential gender gap in tree planting knowledge by the training that 
were offered to all contract holders in their vicinity prior delivering the tree seedlings. 
Moreover, an inspection at the beginning of the contract period revealed all tree 
seedlings to be appropriately planted. Hence, better tree planting knowledge of men 
does not appear as the actual reasoning beyond the increase in men´s environmental 
performance. In this respect, I further scrutinize whether differences in the tree care 
might be responsible for the variation in the tree survivals.  
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Tree care 
The tree care analysis has revealed that men allocated significantly less time to tree 
care than women, and that women were more likely to conduct the two most frequent 
tree care activities after watering, that are weeding and fertilizing (see 4.4). Aiming at 
explaining the decrease in tree survivals for women, discovering female contract 
holders to provide more effort than men is actually contra-intuitive. Therefore, in the 
next step I examine whether there were differences in the reciprocal support of 
husbands and wives in implementing the conservation contract. 
Particularly, the gender-disaggregated data reveal that more women than men have 
provided labor support in the three main tree management activities to their spouses 
who were awarded the contract. For the case of watering - the most frequent and labor 
intensive activity – female contract holders provided own labor in 76 percent, but men 
only in 67 percent. The gender gap is even more remarkable for weeding, which is also 
a regular and labor intensive practice, where the increase in provision of own labor for 
contracts being awarded to women represents 17 percent. In other words, for 22 
percent of male contract holders their wives conducted the weeding labor, but only 9 
percent of female participants received reciprocate support from their spouses. Next, 
for fertilizing - the third most frequently conducted tree care action - the increase in 
female individual labor represents 11 percent. On the other hand, use of insecticides 
and pesticides was the only activity dominated by male labor, with men being almost 
exclusively responsible in case they were the contract holders while also providing 
great support to their wives. This might relate to the traditionally prevalent role of 
men in the purchase of inputs, whereas the activity was marginally implemented 
compared to the activities with considerable role of women. In addition, the contract 
holders - regardless of gender - were predominantly protecting trees from damage by 
people and strayed animals (Table 28). 
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Table 28 Labor division for tree planting contracts in male-headed 
households 
 Contract 
holder only 
Spouse only Jointly Nb 
Male contract holder (Na=33)     
Watering  67 0 33 33 
Weeding 64 22 14 28 
Fertilizing 82 11 7 28 
Guarding from people 85 0 15 26 
Guarding from animals 84 8 8 13 
Insecticides/Pesticides 100 0 0 14 
Female contract holder (Na=33)     
Watering  76 0 24 33 
Weeding 81 9 10 31 
Fertilizing 93 7 0 27 
Guarding from people 85 0 15 20 
Guarding from animals 87 6 7 15 
Insecticides/Pesticides 50 42 8 12 
Notes: The table is based on the following open question from the evaluation survey: Rank the most important 
activities that you have done to maintain the 30 trees in the last 6 months, and indicate who was conducting the 
activities. The gender roles were assessed from following options: (i) Conduct of the activity by the male household 
member only. (ii) Conduct of the activity by the female household member only. (iii) Joint conduct of the activity by 
both male and female household members. The figures in the table are indicated in percent, that is of the number of 
(male or female) contract holders implementing the activity (denoted as Nb), what was the share in percent 
conducted solely by the contract holder (denoted as contract holder only), solely by the spouse of the contract 
holder (denoted as spouse only), or jointly by the contract holder and the spouse (denoted as jointly). Na In total 98 
contracts were awarded, 43 to men, and 55 to women. Female-headed households (N=18) are excluded from the 
analysis, resulting in 43 male and 37 female contract holders of male-headed households. Out of these, 33 men and 
33 women were interviewed on labor division under the conservation contracts, wherein the missing interviews 
(10 for male and 4 for female contract holders) are random. 
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Hence, the substantial support of women to their husbands in the most frequent tree 
care practices is consistent with the above finding that women are investing labor into 
men´s activities while benefiting rather sporadically from men’s labor. The unequal 
labor support is also in line with other studies in Sub-Sahara Africa, showing that 
women normally have obligations to provide labor for male controlled fields while 
there is not such a responsibility for the men. Moreover, the labor provision to men´s 
fields is even considered superior over women´s own labor (Kiptot & Franzel, 2011; 
Kiptot et al., 2014). In addition, 18 of the total of 98 contracts were awarded to female-
headed households, in which basically women alone performed all tree caring activities 
(Table 29).  
The findings thus show that not only the gender roles, but also the traditionally rooted 
inequality in mutual labor support translated into the PES schemes; with the latter 
providing a possible explanation for male contract holders - despite of investing less 
effort - to achieve significantly higher tree survivals than women.  
Table 29 Labor division for tree planting contracts in female-headed 
households 
 Female contract 
holder only 
Male household´s 
member only 
Jointly N 
Watering  87 6.5 6.5 15 
Weeding 87 6.5 6.5 15 
Fertilizing 92 7 - 13 
Guarding from people 89 11 - 9 
Guarding from animals 100 - - 5 
Insecticides/Pesticides 67 33 - 3 
Notes: The table is based on the question described in Table 28, and assesses exclusively the female-headed 
households (N=18) that were excluded from the former labor division analysis. Of the 18 female-headed households 
15 contract holders were interviewed on gender-disaggregated labor division under the conservation contracts, 
wherein the three missing interviews are random. 
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5.6. Barriers to women´s participation 
In addition, based on the above gender-disaggregated analysis, I identified following 
potential barriers for women to participate in PES schemes: (i) men´s supremacy in 
high-value fields, (ii) the prevailing male land tenure when tree planting and 
conservation practices are conducted on men´s land, (iii) male dominance over tree 
management and erosion abatement practices, (iv) high labor constrains for women, in 
general and in female-headed households in particular, (v) men´s experience with 
negotiations given their role as registered producers with tea and coffee factories, and 
(vi) cultural beliefs that might exclude women from certain activities, including tree 
planting or use of certain tree species.  
In response to women´s barriers to participation, I applied a gender sensitive design 
that has resulted in desired participation rates of men and women (see 2.1). 
Comparing to other studies that sampled at the household level, I have achieved higher 
participation rates of women. Specifically, a previous study in the same area had 61 
percent male and 39 percent female survey respondents, explaining the gender 
distribution as result of the male-dominated culture (Bedru et al., 2011). Also, in the 
auction study in Malawi, participants were less frequently female, compared with non-
participants (Jack 2009, p. 10). However, I cannot conclude on a significant relationship 
between the sampling approach I used and the participation level of women, as the 
study design does not include a counterfactual to compare participation rates. Rather, I 
state that the stratified sampling by gender was successful in achieving a gender 
balanced study.  
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5.7. Discussion and conclusion 
The randomized field trial revealed the participants´ gender to significantly impact the 
willingness to accept and environmental performance of the action-based and 
outcome-based tree planting PES schemes, wherein we found evidence on associations 
between the gender effects and traditional roles of men and women.  
First, I identified lower opportunity costs, in terms of returns to labor, and increased 
cash constrains for women as potential drivers for the 36 percent decrease in women´s 
compared to men´s bids in the action-based treatment. I argue that women not only 
earn less cash income than men, but also for women – who traditionally depend on the 
subsistence farming - the conservation payment represents a very important cash 
income opportunity. This is a completely new insight, as it suggests that beside the 
household´s opportunity costs also the intra-household differences determine the bids. 
Second, I suggest that the 30 percent increase in female bids in the outcome-based 
compared to action-based treatment reflects higher aversion of women than men to 
the risk of not achieving the desired outcome. Thus, while in the action-based 
treatment women´s bids - compared to men - were significantly lower, tendering 
outcome-based contracts shows statistically undistinguishable bids for men and 
women. In trying to link the gendered treatment effect to general risk behavior I 
realized that the gender specific difference in perceptions of risk in the outcome-based 
approach was not predicted by the elicited risk attitudes. The findings highlight that 
risk behavior is context specific, and that gendered responses should be considered in 
the PES design.  
Third, aiming at explaining the gender differences in the environmental performance I 
could prove that all participants - men and women - planted trees in appropriate way, 
and that women provided more effort than men in the contract implementation. And 
yet, men achieved 7 percent higher tree survivals than women. Again, the intra-
household differences provided possible answer, when I revealed inequality in 
reciprocal labor. More women than men have provided labor support in the three main 
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tree care activities to their spouses who were awarded the contract, and in the 18 
female-headed households - out of 98 - women did not receive any support at all.  
Additionally, in this respect, the question arises whether awarding contracts to women 
is a good idea, as this exposes them to even higher labor burden. The female 
participants were, however, willing to accept a tree-planting contract, at the same 
price, again. This suggests that women prefer to fully provide labor and receive the 
contract payment, as they will have to contribute to labor anyway without being 
awarded if their husbands were to receive the contract. Moreover, the 30 percent 
decrease in women´s bids for action-based contracts implies that, despite of the 7 
percent decline in women’s tree survivals, allocating the action-based contract to 
women was highly cost-effective. The effectiveness gain of awarding contracts to 
women was, however, neutralized when tendering contracts tied to outcome. 
Finally, I outline some considerations in the design of gender sensitive PES schemes: 
 Examine men´s and women´s roles, risk behavior, preferences, and constrains at 
the initial stage of PES scheme planning. 
 Apply gender sensitive participatory approaches to increase women´s 
participation and generate gendered perspectives on environmental issues and 
possible solutions. Special attention has to be paid to marginalized female-
headed households, in particular if greater gender equity is the goal. 
 PES policies should match preferences of men and women into the PES design. 
These include among others, decisions on conservation practices, 
environmental outcomes, tree and shrubs species, contract design, conservation 
payment, and non-financial benefits.  
 Integrate gender aspects into the evaluation and revision of PES schemes, with 
respect to both equity and effectiveness. 
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6.  Conclusion 
6.1. Main findings and contribution of the dissertation 
Theory predicts that outcome-based payments, relative to action-based payments, 
offer more flexibility in the choice of relevant conservation actions, and can improve a 
landholder’s intrinsic motivation for the actual conservation outcome. On the other 
hand, the result-oriented approach is also associated with risk, which might prompt 
landholders to ask for higher payments. As these factors are expected to act in opposite 
directions, it is an empirical question, whether the incentive effect or the risk effect 
prevails. While both the auction allocation and linking conservation payments to 
outcomes have potential to improve PES effectiveness, there are only few studies 
examining the combined effect of tendering outcome-based contracts. Similarly, 
whereas the conservation community is increasingly acknowledging the importance of 
gender aspects, empirical results on gendered impacts in conservation, and PES 
schemes in particular, are relatively scarce. I have attempted to fill the research gaps 
by carrying out a field experiment in Kenya. To my knowledge, this PES study is the 
first one to compare auctions for action- and outcome-based contracts in a randomized 
field trial setting, and is also novel in that it applies a gender-sensitive approach that 
allows for assessment of gendered behavior.  
Conservation auction 
The first hypothesis on the risk effect to increase the bids for outcome-based contracts 
could be confirmed for female bidders. In particular, I found (i) women to submit 23 
percent lower bids in the action-based versus outcome-based treatment, and 
conversely 30 percent higher bids in the outcome-based versus action-based 
treatment. At the same time, men did not react differently to the two treatments. In 
addition, the comparison within the treatments reveals (ii) a statistically significant 
decrease of 36 percent in women´s versus men´s bids, or conversely an increase of 55 
percent in men´s versus women´s bids, in the action-based treatment.  
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Further, there is evidence on the willingness to accept to contain strategic elements, 
when bidders bid above, but also below their true opportunity costs. While 
overbidding resulted in contract prices being on average higher than the realized costs, 
the winner´s curse lead to contract drop-outs. Nonetheless, despite of the strategic 
behavior a fraction of the variation in bids could be explained, and highly significant 
and consistent effects were revealed.  
In this context, I found that - besides the participant´s gender - personal characteristics, 
such as life satisfaction, risk attitudes and trust behavior, rather than opportunity costs 
observables determined the bids. Moreover, the impacts of gender and risk behavior 
were consistent with a contingent valuation elicitation, conducted prior the auction. 
While this suggests that the landholders reflected well-defined cost and risk 
expectations into their willingness to accept, the competitive bidding - in contradiction 
to the expectations - has not reduced the willingness to accept. 
The average bid selected in the action-based treatment was significantly lower, 
compared to the outcome-based treatment. However, the potentially high effectiveness 
gains of the action-based auction have been neutralized due to a high drop-out rate of 
the low-cost bidders. Consequently, I could not confirm the second hypothesis on 
increased budgetary effectiveness of the auction for action-based contracts. At the 
same time, the revealed gender effects imply that it might be cheaper and thus more 
effective for the conservation agency to award action-based contracts to women. 
However, the increase in women´s bids in the outcome-based treatment shows that 
tendering outcome-based contracts might neutralize the potential effectiveness gains 
of targeting women. Thus, I found that the choice of the contract type might – as result 
of gendered bidding behavior - define the budgetary effectiveness.  
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Environmental performance 
The third hypothesis on the outcome-based approach to achieve better environmental 
performance could not be confirmed, with the tree survivals being statistically 
undistinguishable for the action-based and outcome-based contracts. Consequently, 
the incentive effect did not outweigh the risk effect revealed for female bidders while 
there was no impact of the contract type for men. Moreover, the field trial disclosed 
participant´s gender, education, group participation, and the payment amount to 
impact the tree survivals. In this regard, the significant association between the tree 
survivals and payments provides supporting evidence on the argumentation that 
decreasing the gap between informational rents and true opportunity costs might 
negatively affect the environmental performance. 
Further, I found the type of contract to play a role in defining tree care, with outcome-
based contract holders being more likely to implement care taking actions conducted 
in addition to watering. Thus, I could confirm the fourth hypothesis that the outcome-
based treatment has incentivized a choice of activities that is expected to lead to the 
desired outcome. Nevertheless, the observed additional tree care of outcome-based 
contract holders did not translate into higher tree survivals. Perhaps, if formulating the 
action-based contract requirement in the way that it does not correlate with the tree 
survivals, I might find more variation in the environmental performance of the two 
contract types.  
The considerations on intrinsic and extrinsic motivations are then end-open. The 
farmers clearly had intrinsic motivation from the outset of the study; however 
surpluses in the conservation payments lead to higher tree survivals and higher 
compliance with the watering requirement. Monitoring also played a crucial role in the 
watering intensity under action-based contracts. High performance of participants who 
received low payments and the continuity results might refer to intrinsic motivation 
and/or expected future tree benefits. The mixed evidence suggests that considering 
long-term perspective in terms of behavioral change rather than short-term 
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achievement of conservation goals might relativize the effectiveness of budgetary 
savings, but also that there might be danger of conservation payments to crowd out 
intrinsic motivation. Consequently, careful considerations in general on the choice of 
conservation mechanism, and on the PES design in particular are essential. 
Gender aspects 
With respect to the fifth and sixth hypotheses the study revealed the participants´ 
gender to significantly impact the willingness to accept and environmental 
performance of the action-based and outcome-based tree planting PES schemes, while 
providing evidence on associations between the gender effects and traditional roles of 
men and women.  
First, I identified lower opportunity costs, in terms of returns to labor, and increased 
cash constrains for women as potential drivers for the decrease in women´s compared 
to men´s bids in the action-based treatment. I argue that women not only earn less cash 
income than men, but also for women – who traditionally depend on the subsistence 
farming - the conservation payment represents a very important cash income 
opportunity. This is a completely new insight, as it suggests that beside the household´s 
opportunity costs also the intra-household differences determine the bids. Second, I 
suggest that the increase in female bids in the outcome-based compared to action-
based treatment reflects higher aversion of women than men to the risk of not 
achieving the desired outcome. The findings highlight that risk behavior is context 
specific, and that gendered responses should be considered in the PES design.  
Third, aiming at explaining the gender differences in the environmental performance I 
could prove that all participants - men and women - planted trees in appropriate way, 
and that women provided more effort than men in the contract implementation. And 
yet, men achieved higher tree survivals than women. Again, the intra-household 
differences provided possible answer, when I revealed inequality in reciprocal labor.  
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The study further suggests that women prefer to fully provide labor and receive the 
contract payment, as they will have to contribute to labor anyway without being 
awarded if their husbands were to receive the contract. Moreover, the 30 percent 
decrease in women´s bids for action-based contracts implies that, despite of  
the 7 percent decline in women’s tree survivals, allocating the action-based contract to 
women was highly cost-effective. The effectiveness gain of awarding contracts to 
women was, however, neutralized when tendering contracts tied to outcome. 
Finally, the findings not only confirm many of the concerns raised in the PES literature 
that tree planting, tree care, and conservation in general, might expose women to 
additional costs without gaining corresponding benefits if gender is not considered 
specifically in contract allocation and generally in PES designs. The study also shows 
that while targeting women improves gendered equity in terms of access to project 
decision-making, trainings and cash, it can also significantly improve the effectiveness 
of the PES scheme. However, as women might be more averse to risk associated with 
PES schemes, or – as the study by Villamor et al. (2014a) show - might react less 
positively to conservation than men, the PES scheme design should always be fine 
tailored to the local conditions, bearing in mind both the gender equity and 
conservation goals. Moreover, as Colfer & Minarchek’s (2013) suggest the conservation 
agency has to consider whether to put effort into improvement within existing 
gendered roles and behavior, or to apply more powerful approaches to effectively 
balance men´s and women´s roles. 
Contribution of the dissertation 
The empirical study contributes to the priority topics of current PES literature – that is 
the effectiveness enhancement through the use of auctions and outcome-based 
payments (Schomers & Matzdorf, 2013). In a broader context the findings are also 
important in the light of carbon projects under the Reducing emissions from 
deforestation and forest degradation (REDD+) mechanism, developed by Parties to the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Particularly, the 
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mechanism is usually assumed as performance based, when communities in 
developing countries would receive results-based payments for their actions (Skutsch 
et al., 2011). Moreover, the use of auctions is also considered, for instance for carbon 
payment schemes in the Amazon (Börner et al., 2010). Furthermore, at time of an 
increasing acknowledgment of gender aspects by the conservation community (Colfer 
& Minarchek, 2013), and of GEF´s commitment to enhancing the degree of gender 
mainstreaming, the dissertation represents a key contribution to the scarce evidence 
on gendered implications in the PES. Additionally, the study findings on gendered 
impacts on effectiveness might be key for motivating the conservation agencies to 
consider gender in environmental projects.  
Further research 
Further experiments on the action-based and outcome-based contracts would provide 
supplementary evidence with respect to budgetary and environmental effectiveness. 
Lessons learnt from this study, on the issue of how to define prescribed actions and 
desired outcomes, or the challenge of winner´s curse and strategic bidding, provide a 
base for further improvement of the experimental design. In addition, possible crowd 
out effects of introducing conservation payments on intrinsic motivation, and the 
impacts on non-participants remain open for further research.  
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6.2. Policy recommendations 
Based on the above findings, I outline some considerations and policy 
recommendations for improved PES design and implementation: 
 The decision on the action-based versus outcome-based approach has to be 
considered carefully, as I proved that the contract type has significantly 
impacted the bidding behavior.  
 As women have shown to bid about 30 percent lower for action-based contracts 
than men, offering conservation payments to women might foster considerable 
effectiveness gains. These might be, however, neutralized if payments are fully 
tied to outcomes.  
 The outcome-based approach incentivizes the choice of actions that is expected 
to deliver the desired outcome. However, if the desired conservation activities 
are known to the conservation agency, action-based contracts with monitoring 
might achieve the same outcome.  
 The conservation agency should bear in mind that what is gained in budgetary 
effectiveness might get lost at the environmental performance. Also, in a long-
term perspective a behavioral change is more effective than short-term 
achievement of conservation goals. 
 From the initial stage of PES schemes gender roles and attitudes should be 
taken into account, and PES policies should match gendered perspectives on 
conservation into the PES design.  
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Annex 1 
Baseline survey of landholders along the Kapingazi River and its tributaries,  
Mt. East Kenya 
October – November 2011 
ENU: Ask the household head or the female spouse depending on who is about to receive the invitation for the 
informational workshop! 
We are conducting a study on conservation in the Kapingazi Catchment in Kenya. The study is conducted by a 
researcher from University of Bonn, Germany, in cooperation with the World Agroforestry Centre (ICRAF), 
Nairobi. We appreciate your VOLUNTARY participation in this survey. The information you disclose will be 
completely CONFIDENTIAL and your opinion will be combined with those of others to give a general view. Your 
privacy will be protected to the maximum. 
 
Enumerator ________________________________________   Altitude___________________________________ 
Respondent’s name________________________________   Longitude_________________________________ 
FDA__________________________________________________   Latitude___________________________________ 
Village_______________________________________________   Date_______________________________________ 
Cell phone number_________________________________   Start time____________ End time________ 
Workshop date_____________________________________ 
I. RESPONDENT’S DEMOGRAPHICS AND OCCUPATION 
1) What is the tenure of the household head over the farmland?      tenure [_____] 
1= Owned with title deed  2=Owned without title deed 3=Rented 4=Borrowed 5=Workers on the 
farm 100=Others___________ 
ENU: Stop the interview if the answer is not 1 or 2. 
 
2) We would like to ask you some personal questions. What is…? 
ENU: Proceed the interview if the respondent is a household head, the spouse or a son/daughter who is in 
charge of the farm. 
Relation to 
household 
head* 
Sex  
1=Male 
2=Female 
Age 
(yr) 
Main 
activity** 
Education 
(number of 
years 
completed) 
Ethnic 
affiliation 
Household size 
Adult Male 
(>=15 ) 
Adult 
Female  
Children 
(<15 ) 
relathead sex age activity edu ethnic nrhhmale nrhhfem nrchildhh 
         
 
*1=Household head 2=Spouse  3=Son/Daughter 4=Others_______________ 
**1=Farmer  2=Off-farm  3=Self-employed 4=Public sector employee 5=Private sector 
employee 6=Disable/unable to work 100=Others ______________________ 
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3) Can you make decisions on what and when to plant on the farm?    candecide[_____] 
1=Yes 2=I do decisions together with my spouse  3=No 
II. LAND-USE AND CROPS 
4) What is the household’s total land owned (in acres)?      totland[_____] 
5) What is the household’s total riparian land owned (in sqm?)    
ripariland[________x30] 
ENU: Explain riparian land as land along the river by 30 meters from the middle of the river into the farm land 
6) What are the main crops planted on your farmland?  
ENU: List crops starting with the one being planted on the greatest area, followed by second greatest area etc. 
 
1=Coffee 2=Tea 3=Maize 
4=Beans 5=Arrow roots 
6=Leaves vegetables 7=Sweet potatoes 
8=Irish potatoes 9=Sorghum  
10=Wheat 11=Tomatoes 
12=Cabbage 13=Cassava 
14=Fruits (bananas, mango, passion fruits, 
avocado etc.) 15=Sugarcane 
100=Others_______________ 
 
 
 
7) Do you irrigate your crops or trees using water from the river?    irrigation[_____] 
1=Yes 2=No 
 
ENU: Skip if answer 2 
8) How much of your crop production is irrigated in a dry season (in %)?    acresirrig[_____] 
 
9) Do you have livestock?          livestock[_____] 
1=Yes 2=No 
ENU: Ask only if answer 1 
10) If yes, would you tell us your herd of livestock at present? 
 
Type of livestock 
 
Animal 
Code 
Number owned (present at your farm and away) 
Oxen/bulls ani01  
Cows/heifer ani02  
Horses/mules ani03  
Calves ani04  
Donkeys ani05  
Sheep ani06  
Goats ani07  
Chicken ani09  
Pigs ani10  
Rabbit ani11  
Others__________ ani100  
 
 
Crop  
ENU: Use codes 
Crop type 
1=cash crop 
2=food crop 
Cropping season  
1=Long rain 
2=Short rain 
3=Permanent 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
102 
 
11) Which year did you start farming?         farmstat [_____] 
12) What is the average daily wage for general farm work in this area?    wage[______] 
 
13) What are the challenges you face if you wished to hire a labour?    labchall[_____] 
1=I don’t need hiring labour 2= There are no challenges 3= I cannot afford it/it’s too expensive 
4=There is lack of labour in rainy seasons 5=There is lack of labour the whole year through
100=Others_____ 
 
III. INCOME, UNCERTAINTY, WELFARE PERCEPTIONS, AND OPPORTUNITY COSTS 
14) What is your household total yearly gross income in KES?     totalincome[_____] 
ENU: We ask about income that includes everything – farming, business, off-farm work, pensions etc. It is the 
total income before deducting any cost. 
 
15) What are your household total yearly expenses in KES?     totalexpens[_____] 
ENU: We ask about all expenses –on farming activities such as paying for inputs and off-farm labour, on school 
fees, food, health, transport etc. 
16) What is the yearly gross income from the riparian area only?    incomeripar[_____] 
ENU: Explain that riparian land is the land along the river by 30 meters from the middle of the river into the 
farm. 
 
17) Do you have a loan or do you get any support?      loansupp[_____] 
1=No  2=Yes, loan from a bank 3=Yes, loan from neighbours or friends   
4=Yes, money from merry go rounds  100=Others_______________________________________ 
 
18) Please answer following questions regarding the household’s income: 
ENU: Make sure that the income percentages add to 100%! 
What is/are the household’s … 
 
Code Income type 
ENU: Use codes 
What is the % out of 
the total income? 
Who earns the income? 
1=Male, 2=Female, 
3= Both - indicate % 
main source of income? income1     
2nd main source of income? income2    
3rd main source of income? income3    
other sources of income? income100    
1=Cropping activities 2=Livestock activities 3=Business 4=Salaried work 5=Off-farm work
6=Renting land/house 7=Pensions 8=Remittances 100=Others________________ 
 
19) Please answer following questions regarding the household’s expenses: 
ENU: Make sure that the income percentages add to 100%! 
What are the household’s … 
 
Code Expenses type 
ENU: Use codes 
What is the % out of 
the total expenses? 
Who decides on the 
expenses? 
1=Male, 2=Female, 
3= Both - indicate % 
main expenses? expens1     
2nd main expenses? expens2    
3rd main expenses? expens3    
other expenses? expens100    
1=Food 2=Clothing 3=Electricity 4=Water 5=School fees 6=Health care 7=Transport
8=Farm inputs 9=Hiring off-farm labour 10=Paying rent for land/house 100=Others________________ 
 
20) What would be the yearly rent you would expect if renting out the riparian area?  opripariarent[_____] 
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ENU: Show the farmer what is the distance of 30 meters (use steps) and make sure that he/she understands 
what land size are you asking about. 
 
21) What was the trend in the household total gross income in last 5 years?   incometrend[_____] 
1=Highly decreasing 2=Slightly decreasing 3=The same 4=Slightly increasing 5=Highly increasing 
22) How likely is your household’s income going to change in next 12 months compared to last year?
chnginc[_____] 
1=Very likely 2=Somewhat likely  3=Will be the same 
ENU:Skip if answer 3 
23) What are the main causes of change in your household yearly gross income?   ENU: Rank 1-3 
 estimincdiff1[_____]  estimincdiff2[_____]  estimincdiff3[_____] 
1=Change in crop market prices 2=Change in yields 3=Change in wages obtained from off-farm labour   
4=Change in income from salaried work 5=Possible shocks (illness, death) 6=Natural disasters 
(droughts, storm, pest) 7=Climate variability/change  100=Others____________ 
24) All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life over the past 12 months? gensatisfac[_____] 
1=unsatisfied 2=rather unsatisfied 3=rather satisfied   4=satisfied 
25) Has the household’s income over the past 12 months been sufficient to cover what you consider to be the needs 
of the household?          incomesatisfac[_____] 
1=yes 2=reasonable (just about sufficient)  3=no 
26) Compared with other households in the village, how well-off is your household?  welloffvill[_____] 
1=better-off 2=about average  3=worse-off 
27) Has the household’s food production over the past 12 months been sufficient to cover what you consider to be 
the needs of the household?         foodenough[_____] 
1=yes 2=reasonable (just about sufficient)  3=no 
28) How many months in a year do you have to purchase your main food (maize, beans, potatoes etc.)
foodpurch[_____] 
1=Don´t buy 2=Buy_________________________ 
Skip if answer 1 
 
29) Does this number of months vary year to year?      foodvary[_____] 
1=Yes, it varies a lot (by more than one month) 2=It somewhat varies (by several weeks) 3=No, it’s 
almost the same 
IV. OTHER ASSETS AND INFRASTRUCTURE 
ENU: Fill in following information on the housing conditions in questions 30) and 31) 
30) Roofing type:            roof[_____] 
1=Grass 2=Iron sheet 3=Bricks 100=Others___________ 
 
31) Type of wall:            wall [_____] 
1=Stone 2=Mud  3=Timber 4=Iron Sheets  5=Bricks 100=Others________________ 
 
32) What is the main source of water for the household?      watersource[_____] 
1=River 2=Tap water 3=Community wells 4=Bore holes 5=Rainwater 6=Spring water 
100= Others__________ 
 
33) Do you have electricity at your homestead?       electricity[_____] 
1=Yes 2=No 
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34) Please indicate which items are owned by the household: 
 
Item Item 
code 
Owned 
ENU: Tag items that are owned by the household 
 nritem[_
____] 
 
Car/Truck/Tractor item01  
Motorcycle item02  
Bicycle item03  
Cell phone item04  
TV item05  
Radio item06  
Stove for cooking/gas cooker item07  
Refrigerator item08  
Wheel barrow item09  
Ox cart item10  
Ox plough item11  
Water tank item12  
Food storage item13  
Irrigation equipment/pump item14  
Posho mill item15  
Sprayer (hand/ox/tractor drawn) item16  
Sofa set item17  
Wall unit item18  
Computer item10  
Others with value over 5000 KES 
__________________________________________ 
item100  
 
35) What is the distance from your home to the nearest tarmac road?     disttmk[_____] 
36)  What is the distance from your home to the nearest health centre?     disthc [_____] 
37) What is the distance from your home to the main market?      distmarkt[_____] 
38) What is the distance from your home to the collection centre of your produce (coffee, tea)? distcoll[_____] 
39) What is the distance from your home to the nearest input store?     distinput[_____] 
V. PLANTING TREES, USE OF WATER AND SOIL, AND ECOLOGICAL KNOWLEDGE 
40) If you would plant 30 tree seedlings at the riparian area in December, in your opinion, how many out of 30 
would survive for six months if you don’t take care of them after planting, i.e. if you would leave them the given 
the natural conditions?          
treenatsurv[_____] 
 
41) If you would plant 30 tree seedlings at the riparian area in December, in your opinion, how many out of 30 
would survive for six months if you take a good care of them?    
treecaresurv[_____] 
 
42) What do you understand by “good care”? ____________________________________________________________________________ 
43) In your opinion what can make the tree die or to be in a poor condition?    treedeath[_____] 
ENU: Indicate all reasons 
1=droughts 2=inappropriate soil conditions 3=inappropriate planting of the seedling 4=disease
5=termites 6=weeds 7=other people cutting/destroying 100=Others________________________ 
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44) If you would be offered a payment for (i) planting 30 tree seedlings at your riparian area, and (ii) for the 
subsequent care for the trees for six months, what would be the amount of payment you would accept? 
            
WTA[_________] 
1=I would not plant the trees for any payment 2=I would accept following payment_____________________ 
 
45) In your assessment, what has been the general trend in the average yearly quantity of water from the Kapingazi 
River and its tributaries in this area in the last 10 years?     waterquantity[_____] 
1=Decreased 2=Increased 3=Remained the same 4=Don’t know 
 
46) In your assessment, what has been the general trend in the average yearly quality of water available from the 
Kapingazi River and its tributaries in this area in the last 10 years?    waterquality[_____] 
1=Decreased 2=Increased 3=Remained the same 4=Don’t know 
47) Do you experience any form of soil erosion in your farm?     erosion[_____] 
1=Yes 2=No 
48) What do you usually use for cooking?        fuelcook[_____] 
ENU: Indicate all 
1=Firewood  2=Kerosene 3=Gas 4=Charcoal 5=Crop residue 
6=Animal dung  7=Electricity 100=Others__________________ 
 
49) Where do you get the above fuel used?       wherefuel[_____] 
ENU: Indicate all 
1=Own farm 2=Own trees 3=Forest 4=Purchased from market/shop 5=Purchased from villagers
100=Others_____ 
 
50) In your assessment, what has been the general trend in the quantity of firewood available in your village in the 
last 10 years?           firewoodquant[_____] 
1=Decreased 2=Increased 3=Remained the same   4=Don’t know   
ENU: Ask only if answer 1 
51) If the availability of firewood decrease, how do you cope with it? ______________________________________________________ 
 
52) Do you think climate change affects the current land use and farming practices in the area?  climatech[_____] 
1=Yes 2=No 
ENU: Explain climate change as variability in rains or unexpected events such as extreme droughts. 
ENU: Ask only if answer 1 
53) If you experience climate change, how is your farm affected? ______________________________________________________ 
ENU: Ask only if by question 52 answer 1 
54) If you experience climate change, how do you cope with it? ____________________________________________________ 
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55) Do you practice any of the following soil and water conservation methods and who is performing the methods? 
ENU: Go column by column. 
Conservation methods 
ENU: Tag the methods in use 
Who is performing the 
conservation methods? 
1=Male 
2=Female 
3=Both – indicate %_____________ 
consmeth consmethgen 
1. Tree planting  
2.Napier grass  
3.Other grass strips  
4.Terracinga  
5.Contour ploughingb  
6.Crop rotationc  
7.Cover croppingd  
8. Mixed croppinge  
9. Roof rainwater harvesting  
10. Drought resistant crop varieties  
100. Others____________________________  
aTerraces consist of ridges and channels constructed across-the-slope. 
bContour ploughing is the farming practice of ploughing across a slope following its elevation contour lines while in the case of contour 
bounding stones are placed around the contours of slopes. 
cCrop rotation is practice of growing a series of dissimilar types of  in the same area in sequential seasons. 
dCover crops to be planted at the end of the growing season in order to protect the soil surface from wind and water erosion and maintain the 
soil quality. 
eMixed cropping is practise of sowing two or more crops together on the same land area, one being the main crop and the others the 
subsidiaries. 
 
VI. GENDER 
56) Who among the household members serves as the decision-maker for the following activities and who 
performs the activities? ENU: Ask row by row 
 
ENU: Following questions are on labour division within the household only and do not include off-farm labour. 
If no household member is conducting a particular task fill dash. If only one household member is making 
decisions and performing the activities indicate why this is the case under the table. 
 
Farm related activities Decision-
maker 
1=male, 
2=female, 
3=both 
Code Who performs the 
agreed 
actions/activities? 
1=male, 2=female, 
3=both 
Code 
Attendance in community meetings  attpolmeet  perfpolmeet 
Attendance in farm-related 
training/seminars/field days 
 atttrain  perftrain 
Farm management decisions 
What crop where to plant  decplant  makeplant 
Whether plant trees/what trees/where to 
plant  
 dectree  maketreeplant 
What/how much /where to buy inputs (seeds, 
fertilizer) 
 decinput  useinput 
Whom to hire  dechire  hirepaylab 
When to harvest  decharvest  makeharvest 
Weeding  decweed  makeweed 
Pruning  decprun  makeprun 
Mulching  decmulch  makemulch 
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Marketing produce 
What/when/where to sell produce  decsell  makesell 
Manage money from sell xxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxx  mngmoney 
What to keep for consumption  deccons xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxx 
Others 
Children’s education  decchildedu  learnchild 
Household expenses/saving incomes  decexpen  makeexp 
Taking care of relatives  deccare  makecare 
Others  decother2  makeother2 
 
VII.  SOCIAL CAPITAL, TRUST, AND RISK BEHAVIOUR 
57) Are you generally a person who is fully prepared to take risks or do you try to avoid taking risks? Please decide 
for a number on a scale between 0 and 10, where the value 0 means: ‘unwilling to take risks’ and the value 10 
means: ‘fully prepared to take risks’.         genrisk[_____] 
 
58) Would you prefer to get 100 KES or a lottery ticket with a 50% chance of winning 400 KES?   risklottery[_____] 
1=Get 100 KES 2=Go for lottery with 50% chance of winning 400 KES 
 
59) What would you prefer?         discountrate[_____] 
1=100 KES today 2=300 KES in a week 3=1000 KES in a month 
 
60) Do you participate in any group, association, committee or community activities?  grouppart[_____] 
1=Yes 2=No 
ENU: Skip if answer 2 
61) Please indicate: 
Name of the group/association/activity you 
participate in  
Who 
participated?* 
Major activities 
 
   
   
   
   
   
*1=Male in the household 2=Female in the household 3=Both 
 
ENU: Skip if by question 60 answer 1: 
62) If you are no member to any group/association, why? ______________________________________________ 
 
63) Have you had a problem with one of your neighbours/village members in the last 3 years? probnghbr[_____] 
1=Yes 2=No 
ENU: Skip if answer 2 
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64) What kind of problem have you had with one of your neighbours/village members in the last 3 years? 
            
kindprobnghbr[______] 
1=boundaries of the farm (property rights) 2=damage to my crops by neighbours´ animals  
3=damage to neighbours´ crops by my animals 4=conflicts among mine and neighbours´ children
100=Others____________________ 
65) Have you had a problem with any stranger in the last 3 year?    problstrngr[_____] 
1=Yes 2=No 
ENU: Skip if answer 2 
66) What kind of problem have you had with strangers in the last 3 year?   kindproblstrng[_____] 
1=Land property rights  100=Others____________________ 
67) Generally speaking, do you think that most people can be trusted, or you have to be careful when dealing with 
people?           generaltrust[_____] 
1=Most people can be trusted  2=You have to be careful when dealing with people 
 
ENU: Immediately following this trust question, respondents should answer following question: 
a) In answering the last question, who came to your mind when you were thinking about ‘‘most people’’? 
________________________________________________________________ 
ENU: Respondents should indicate all people that came into their mind – ask “Who else?” 
68) How much do you trust people in your local area?      localtrust [______] 
1=A lot  2=A fair amount 3=Not very much 4=Not at all 
ENU: Immediately following this trust question, respondents should answer following question: 
b) In answering the last question, who came to mind when you were thinking about ‘‘people in your local 
area’’? _________________________________________________________________ 
 
ENU: Respondents should indicate all people that came into their mind – ask “Who else?” 
69) Have you ever borrowed money - from somebody or a bank or other institution?  loaned[_____] 
1=Yes 2=No 
 
70) Have you ever loaned money to someone?        giveloan[_____] 
1=Yes 2=No 
ENU: Skip if answer 2 
71) Did the person pay on time?         giveloanexp[_____] 
1=Yes 2=Paid beyond the term 3=Failed to pay 
 
72) Have you ever spontaneously benefited from a person you did not know before?  benefitstrngr[_____] 
1=Yes 2=No 
73) If you lost a wallet or a purse including your identity card, how likely is it to be returned with the money in it if 
it was found by someone who lives close by?       walletlocal[_____] 
1=Very likely 2=Somewhat likely 3=Not likely at all 
 
74) If you lost a wallet or a purse including your identity card, how likely is it to be returned with the money in it if 
it was found by a complete stranger?        walletstrngr[_____] 
1=Very likely 2=Somewhat likely 3=Not likely at all 
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75) Have you been involved with any organization promoting conservation or development in this area? 
Examples of conservation activities-tree planting, water or soil conservation, trainings  
involvedcons[_____] 
1=Yes 2=No 
ENU: Skip if answer 2 
76) Provide names of the organizations: ________________________________________________________________ 
ENU: Skip if by question 75 answer 2 
77) How was your experience with the conservation organization?    exprncconsorg[_____] 
1=Very good 2=Good 3=Not very good 4=Not good at all 
ENU: Skip if by question 75 answer 2 
78) Why? __________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
79) Imagine a situation when your community will be given a certain amount of funds for conservation. Whom 
would you choose for managing these funds?       oldorgtrst [_____] 
1=Current organisations in place 2=A new organisation 
ENU: Immediately following this question, respondents should answer following question: 
a) In answering the last question on managing the conservation funds, what organization or institution came 
to your mind when you were thinking of “current organisations in place”? 
______________________________________________________ 
ENU: If respondent has chosen answer 2 in 79), he should answer following question (otherwise skip): 
b) In answering the question on managing of conservation funds, what organization or institution came to 
your mind when you were thinking about “a new organisation”? 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
80) Who do you trust most to give advices on agricultural practices and conservation? 
__________________________________ 
 
VIII. CONSERVATION ATTITUDES AND ASPIRATIONS 
81) Tell me if you agree or disagree with the following statements: 
 
Statement Code Agree Disagree 
There is a relationship between my individual farming 
activities and the water quality in my area. 
relfarm   
Tree planting is labour intensive. treelab   
Conservation plays an important role in society today. consrole   
I would be willing to protect water resources in my area 
for the sake of everybody. 
protectwat   
Research organizations have played an important role in 
conservation issues. 
rsrchrole   
There is enough firewood for the next generation. woodnext   
Water quality is a major problem. wqualprob   
The farming activities at the riparian banks affect water 
quality. 
ripactwqual   
More trees lead to increased water quantity. treeswquant   
I can count on government officials to act in my best 
interest. 
trustgovern   
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A bad health condition of me or the family members 
does not allow us to take a good care of the farm. 
healthfarm   
I feel obliged to conserve the environment. obligedenv   
The quality of the water I get is affected by the activities 
of the people who are living or farming upstream. 
upstrmwqual   
Water scarcity is a major problem affecting crop 
production in this area. 
wscarc   
The riparian land is the most productive. riparprod   
More trees lead to better water quality. treeswqual   
People in this area are generally concerned with 
conservation. 
peoplecons   
 
82) What would you like to achieve or get improved in the next five years? ENU: Rank 1-5 
Aspiration 1 _______________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Aspiration 2 _______________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Aspiration 3 _______________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Aspiration 4 _______________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Aspiration 5 _______________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
IX. RIPARIAN AREA 
83) Go to the river and measure (using GPS and measuring tape): 
ENU: Riparian land is the land along the river by 30 meters from the middle of the river into the farm. 
 
Riparian land buffer width (in meters) – ENU: Control the figure of 5) and correct   
Riparian land under crops (in sqm)  ripcropland  
Not usable/idle riparian land (in sqm) ripidleland  
Riparian woodlot – land purely occupied by trees (in sqm) riptreeland  
Number of trees at the riparian land (number) riptrees  
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Annex 2 
Evaluation Survey  
July 2012 
For farmers with conservation contracts. 
Respondent’s name________________________________ ID__________________________________ 
Contract type: (tag one of the two options) (1) Action-based (2) Outcome-based 
FDA__________________________________________________ Village_____________________________ 
Cell phone number_________________________________ Date _______________________________ 
Instruction for the enumerator: IF NO OTHER INSTRUCTION THEN READ THE OPTIONS TO THE FARMER 
AND TAG THE PARTICULAR ANSWER. 
Opportunity costs vs. Benefits and Pro-poor effect 
1. Would you participate in the project again given the same payment? 
1-Yes 2-No 
 
2. What would be the lowest payment that would still encourage you to participate in the project? 
__________Ksh for six months tree planting project 
 
3. If you didn’t participate in the contract, what would you have been doing at the time when you were caring 
for the trees planted in your riparian?  _______________________________ 
 
4. Aside from the payment, what benefit did you get from participating in the tree-planting contract?  
_________________________ 
 
5. Were you satisfied with the tree species you received from the project? 
1-Yes 2-No 
 
6. What benefits do you expect the trees to give you in the future? 
Instructions: Let the farmer tell you all benefits and tag them. Ask “What else?” 
 
0-None 1-Firewood  2-Timber 3-Fodder 4-Leaves as mulch  5-Improved soil
  
6- Help reduce erosion  7-Retaining water – soil keeps moisture  8-Shade-good for other 
plants 9-Pollination 10-Medical use 11-Improved water quality in the river  
100-Others______________ 
 
7. How important are these tree benefits to you?  
1- Benefits important, but the payment more important 2-Benefits and the payment both equally important 
3-Benefits more important than the payment 
 
8. How much in terms of time and money do you expect to gain from the firewood given by the project trees in 
five/ten years from now? 
Weekly time saved on firewood collection____________hours (after 5 years),____________hours (after 10 years) 
Annual income saved on firewood purchase__________Ksh (after 5 years),   _______________Ksh (after 10 years) 
Annual income from firewood sale__________________Ksh (after 5 years),   _______________Ksh (after10 years) 
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9. How much money do you expect to gain from fodder given by the project trees in five/ten years from now?  
Weekly time saved on fodder collection______________hours (after 5 years),____________hours (after 10 years) 
Annual income saved on fodder purchase____________Ksh (after 5 years),   ______________Ksh (after 10 years) 
Annual income from fodder sale____________________Ksh (after 5 years),   ______________Ksh (after 10 years) 
 
10. How much money do you expect to gain from improved soil conditions and decreased erosion in five/ten 
years from now?  
Increase in annual income by________________Ksh (after 5 years), by__________________Ksh (after 10 years) 
 
11. How much money do you expect to gain from increased agricultural productivity as result of leaves 
mulching, shade conditions and pollination in five/ten years from now?  
Increase in annual income by_________________Ksh (after 5 years), by__________________Ksh (after 10 years) 
  
12. How much money do you expect to gain from improved water quality and medical use of the project trees in 
five/ten years from now?  
Increase in annual income by_________________Ksh (after 5 years), by__________________Ksh (after 10 years) 
 
13. How much money do you expect to gain from timber from the project trees in five/ten years from now?  
Total income from timber sale (number of trees cut*timer sale price for a tree)____________Ksh (after 5 years) 
Total income from timber sale (number of trees cut*timer sale price for a tree)____________Ksh (after 10 years) 
 
14. How much money do you expect to be the total gain from the project trees in five/ten years from now?  
_______________________Ksh (for 5 years), _____________________Ksh (for 10 years) 
 
15. What was the tree-planting cost considering all expenses - time, productive land loss due to tree planting, 
input and travel cots, etc.? _______________________Ksh (for the six-month period) 
 
16. How much do you expect to be the total cost of the trees planted considering all expenses - time, productive 
land loss due to tree planting, inputs etc. in five/ten years from now?  
Total cost  _______________Ksh (for 5 years), ____________________Ksh (for 10 years) 
 
17. Did the conservation payment help your household to improve the current livelihood? 
1-Not at all  2-A little 3-Much 
18. Who makes decisions on how the payment is going to be used for? 
1-Male household member only 2-Female household member only 3-Both male and female household 
members: Male______% , Female______% 
19. What is the conservation payment going to be used for?  
1-Food 2-Health 3-Education/school fees 4-Agricultural inputs  5-Cover debits 6-Transport  
7-Business activities  100-Others______________________________ 
 
Comparison Action-based vs. Outcome-based conservation contracts activities 
20. Rank the most important activities that you have done to maintain your trees in the last 6-months and 
indicate who was mainly conducting the activities: 
Instruction for the enumerator: Let the farmer tell you the main activity and then tag the particular code.  
DO NOT READ THE OPTIONS TO THE FARMER! 
Main Activity: _______________ Conducted by:_______________ 
Second Activity: _____________ Conducted by:_______________ 
Third Activity: _______________ Conducted by:_______________ 
Fourth Activity:______________ Conducted by:_______________ 
Fifth Activity:________________ Conducted by:_______________ 
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Codes on activities:  0-None  1-Watering 2-Weeding 3-Fencing 
4-Fertilizing/Mulching 5-Guarding from animals 6-Guarding from people 
7-Use of insecticides/pesticides  100-Others_______________ 
 
Codes on gender roles: 1-Male household member only 2-Female household member only  
3-Both male and female household members: Male______% , Female______% 4-Male child only (<15 
years) 5-Female child only (<15years) 6-Both male and female children (<15 years): Male 
child:______%, Female child:______%  7- Adult household members and children: Adults_____%, 
Children:_________%  8-Off-farm labour: Male 9-Off-farm labour: Female 10-Off-farm labour: 
Both male and female: Male____%, Female_____% 
 
21. How often did you water the trees (if no rain)? 
Instruction for the enumerator: Let the farmer tell you the main activity and then tag the particular code.  
DO NOT READ THE OPTIONS TO THE FARMER! 
0-Never 1- Twice a day 2-Once a day  3-Once in two days 4-Once in three days 5-Once in four days 
6-Once in five days 7-Once in six days 8- Once in a week (seven days) 9-Drip irrigation using 
bottles – frequency of re-filling______ 10-Drip irrigation using tap-frequency_______ 100-Others_______ 
 
22. How many hours a week, on average, did you spend for caring for the 30 trees planted at your riparian land 
– in the dry season (January-March)? 
_______________hours/week 
 
23. How many hours a week, on average, did you spend for caring for the 30 trees planted at your riparian land 
– in the rainy season (April-June)? 
_______________hours/week 
Conservation attitudes and social norms – both contract types 
24. What was your main goal during the six-month tree-planting project? 
1-To keep soil around the trees moist (i.e. fulfilling watering requirement)  2-To keep the planted trees 
surviving 3-Both, to keep soil moist and the trees surviving 
 
25. How would you feel about a tree you planted dying (general question not in relation with the project!)?  
Instruction for the enumerator: Read the options to the farmer and tag the particular answer. 
1-No special feeling, it just happens 2-I would feel sad as I want the tree to survive (intrinsic value) 
3-I would feel disappointed as I spent time on caring for the tree (opportunity cost-intrinsic value) 
 
26. Do you expect your children to benefit from trees you plant? 
1-Yes 2-No 
 
27. Do you agree or disagree that a good farmer is caring for plants on his farm on a scale from 1 to 5 (when 1 is 
agree very much, and 5 is very much disagree)? 
Agree ( ) 1 ( ) 2 ( ) 3 ( ) 4 ( ) 5 Disagree 
 
28. Do you agree or disagree that you feel obliged to plant a tree once you receive a seedling on a scale from 1 to 
5 (when 1 is agree very much, and 5 is very much disagree)? 
Agree ( ) 1 ( ) 2 ( ) 3 ( ) 4 ( ) 5 Disagree 
 
29. Do you agree or disagree that you feel obliged to take good care of a tree once planted on a scale from 1 to 5 
(when 1 is agree very much, and 5 is very much disagree)? 
Agree ( ) 1 ( ) 2 ( ) 3 ( ) 4 ( ) 5 Disagree 
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30. Do you agree or disagree that planting trees is a responsibility/obligation on a scale from 1 to 5 (when 1 is 
agree very much, and 5 is very much disagree)? 
Agree ( ) 1 ( ) 2 ( ) 3 ( ) 4 ( ) 5 Disagree 
 
31. Do you agree or disagree that the fact you were among the farmers selected in a conservation tender 
increased the importance of the tree planting on your farm as compared to a situation without a tender 
where everybody could participate, on a scale from 1 to 5 (when 1 is agree very much, and 5 is very much 
disagree)? 
Agree ( ) 1 ( ) 2 ( ) 3 ( ) 4 ( ) 5 Disagree 
 
32. Do you agree or disagree that the act of signing a conservation contract increased the importance of the tree 
planting on your farm as compared to a situation without a contract? 
Agree ( ) 1 ( ) 2 ( ) 3 ( ) 4 ( ) 5 Disagree 
 
33. Do you agree or disagree that most people would breach the conservation contract, i.e. would not be 
fulfilling the requirements, if there were no payment, on a scale from 1 to 5 (when 1 is agree very much, and 
5 is very much disagree)? 
Agree ( ) 1 ( ) 2 ( ) 3 ( ) 4 ( ) 5 Disagree 
 
34. What was in your opinion the main aim of the project you participated in? 
Instruction for the enumerator: Read the options to the farmer and tag the particular answer. 
1-To monitor the contract requirements, i.e. if soil is kept moist by action-based, and if trees survive by 
outcome-based contracts 2-To reward farmers for tree planting 3-To plant trees and assure their 
survival 
35. How do you feel about sanctions in this project? 
 
Instruction for the enumerator: According to the contract type read only one of the options to the farmer and 
tag the particular answer. 
1-Sanctions are necessary in order to keep the trees alive (conservation) 2-Sanctions are necessary in 
order to make the project conditions the same for everybody (fairness)  3-Sanctions are not good 
36. How fair did you find that everybody got different payment on a scale from 1 to 5 (when 1 is not fair at all, 
and 5 is very fair)? 
Not fair at all ( ) 1 ( ) 2 ( ) 3 ( ) 4 ( ) 5 very fair 
 
37. Please tell us why did you find the different payment fair/unfair (depending on the previous answer!)? 
_______________________________ 
 
38. Do you think it would be better if everybody got the same initial payment (that would be reduced in case of 
non-compliance with the contract conditions)? 
1-Yes 2-No 
 
39. Why do you think it would be/it would not be better if everybody got the same initial payment? 
__________________________________ 
Conservation attitudes and social norms – Action-based contracts specifically 
Questions 38, 39, and 40 only for ACTION-BASED farmers: 
40. How often would you water the trees (if no rain) if your payment would depend on the tree survival rates, 
and not on the watering requirement – as compared to what you did? 
 
1-The same  2-More  3-Less 
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41. If you were not paid for keeping the soil moist but tree survival, what actions would you have done to take 
care of the trees? Instruction for the enumerator: If the farmers were conducting different actions, let him 
tell you ALL the activities he would have done.  
 
1-The same  2-Different _________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
42. What was your main motivation to water the trees?  
 
1. Get the payment  2. Make the tree survive 3. Get the payment and make the tree survive 
Future trees survival and Additionality 
43. Would you plant 30 trees at your riparian area if given free seedlings and no payment? 
1-Yes 2-No 3-I would plant less___________ 
 
44. Would you give the trees the same care as you did in this project? 
1-The same care 2-Less care 3-More care 
 
45. If we would give you tree seedlings only, without the payment, how many of the 30 tree seedlings you would 
plant do you think would survive?  
Instruction for enumerator: If in Q.41 answer 3, i.e. the farmer would plant less trees, ask how many of those 
trees he would plant would then survive and indicate the whole answer: E.g. 15 out of 20 trees. 
_________________ 
 
46. If no payment were offered, what alternative reward would encourage you to conduct the tree-planting? 
 
Instructions to enumerator: Distinguish between “There is no alternative to payment” and “Don’t know 
which alternative”, or list all alternatives that were given.  
 
1- There is no alternative to payment  2-Don´t know which alternative     
3-Alternatives________________________  
 
47. How many more trees than those in the agreement did you care for in the last six months? __________ 
 
48. What are your plans with the trees in the next year: 
1-Keep watering them and support survival  2-Uproot and use area for other purposes  
3-Do nothing. If tree survives it’s OK 
 
49. How many trees – out of 30 you planted at the riparian area - do you expect to survive in 5 years? 
________________________ 
 
50. Do you agree or disagree that participation in this project will encourage you to plant more trees in the 
future (being your own decision, i.e. that is without a project participation)? 
1-Agree 2-Disagree 
 
51. How many additional trees do you plan to plant on your farm in next twelve months? _____________ 
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Transaction costs 
52. How many hours did you spent on participation in the survey and all the meetings required to participate in 
this program (including transport time)? 
________________hours 
 
53. What would you use the time for instead of participating in the survey and the meetings? 
1-Farming activities 2-Collecting water 3-Collecting firewood 4-Taking care of children  
5-Sale on the market 6-Leisure 100-Others_____________ 
 
Project challenges and lessons learnt 
54. What were the challenges you encountered during the six-month tree-planting project? 
___________________________________________________________ 
55. How would you improve the project? 
_____________________________________________ 
56. What lessons did you learn from the project? 
 
________________________________________ 
 
57. How much did you trust that you would receive the payment for tree-planting after the six month period on 
a scale from 1 to 5 (when 1 is trusted very much, and 5 is did not trust at all)? 
 
Trusted very much ( ) 1 ( ) 2 ( ) 3 ( ) 4 ( ) 5 Did not trust at all 
 
58. Why did you have this trust/mistrust as indicated in the previous question? 
 
___________________________________________ 
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Annex 3 
Action-Based Tree Planting Research Agreement 
 
Relating to the implementation of land-use change leading to enhanced 
supply of watershed and carbon sequestration services 
 
Between 
ZEF-University of Bonn/ICRAF 
And 
 
Name:_____________________________________________ 
Year of Birth:________________________________________ 
Address/Village:_____________________________________ 
Identification Number_________________________________ 
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This agreement (“this Agreement”) is made on December, 14th 2011 (“Execution of this 
Agreement”). 
between 
(1) ZEF/University of Bonn with registered office at Walter-Flex-Str. 3, 53113 Bonn, Germany, 
and the World Agroforestry Centre – ICRAF with registered office at P.O. Box 30677-00100, 
Nairobi, Kenya (the “Buyers”) 
(2) _________________________________ with identification number ___________________ (the “Seller”) 
Whereas: 
A. The Seller agrees to implement “Tree Planting” as defined below;  
B. The Buyer agrees to make payment to the Seller (“Conservation Payment”) subject to the 
“Monitoring Requirements, Conditions and Sanctions” and “Payment Conditions”; 
C. The Buyer agrees to procure for the Seller the tree seedlings necessary to implement the Tree 
Planting. 
It is agreed as follows: 
1. Definitions 
“Riparian Land” means the land along the river 30 meters from the middle of the river into the 
farm land. 
“Riparian Land Width” means the width of the land along the river. 
2. Payment Conditions 
2.1 90% of the “Conservation Payment” of _____________________ KES will be made by the Buyer 
to the Seller once the Buyer has verified that Tree Planting is implemented and 
maintained in accordance with the “Tree Planting Requirements” and the “Monitoring 
Requirements, Conditions and Sanctions”. 
2.2 The verification of the Conservation Payments will be conducted within one month after 
the Expire Term of this Agreement (i.e. from June, 22nd, 2012 to July, 21st, 2012). 
2.3 10% of the Conservation Payment will be made by the Buyer to the Seller at the day of the 
Execution of this Agreement (i.e. December, 14th, 2011). 
2.4 All Riparian Land subject to Seller’s control or ownership is eligible for implementation of 
Tree Planting under the terms of this Agreement. 
3. Seller’s Warranties 
3.1 The Seller warrants to the Buyer that he owns a Riparian Land at the Kapingazi River or 
its tributaries; 
3.2 The Seller warrants to the Buyer that he owns Riparian Land with a minimum of 12 
meters width along the river. 
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4. Dispute Resolution 
4.1 In the event there is any dispute in respect of the terms of this Agreement between Buyer 
and Seller, this dispute shall be referred to the “Dispute Resolution Committee”, the 
decision of which shall be binding upon both the Buyer and the Seller. 
4.2 The Dispute Resolution Committee consists of representatives of the local administration 
(chiefs and assistance chiefs) and representatives of the Kenya Forest Service (KFS). 
5. Term 
5.1 This Agreement will expire on June, 22nd 2012 (“Expire Term”). 
6. Force Majeure 
6.1 Neither Buyer nor Seller shall be liable for any failure to perform its obligations where 
such failure is as a result of acts of nature (including fire, flood, storm or other natural 
disaster). 
6.2 Either Buyer or Seller asserting acts of nature as an excuse shall have the burden of 
proving that reasonable steps were taken (under the circumstances) to minimise 
damages caused by unexpected events, and that the other party was timely notified of the 
occurrence of the unexpected events. 
 
 
In witness whereof this Agreement has been duly executed.  
 
 
Date: December, 14th, 2011 
 
 
Authorised Buyer Signatories 
Lucie Andeltova 
ZEF-University of Bonn/ICRAF 
 
Authorised Seller Signatories 
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Schedule 1 
Tree Planting Requirements 
I. The Seller shall: 
1. Plant 30 tree seedlings provided by the Buyer on the Riparian Land (i.e. within 30 meters 
from the middle of the river into the farm land) according to the following instructions: 
1.1. The trees shall be planted in rows - minimum of two rows and maximum of eight rows; 
1.2. The minimum distance between the trees shall be three meters; 
1.3. The maximum distance between the rows shall be six meters; 
1.4. The maximum distance of the first row of trees from the middle of the river should be 
five meters; 
1.5. Trees that were at the Riparian Land before this Agreement can be interplanted within 
the rows of the tree seedlings subject to the minimum distance of three meters; 
1.6. The trees shall be planted in rows as shown in the following illustration: 
 
 
 
2. Compliance on Tree Planting Requirements will be monitored within first month after 
Execution of this Agreement; 
 
II. The Seller shall not: 
1. Replace tree seedlings procured by the Buyer by new seedlings. 
 
III. Sanctions  
1. Any violation of the Tree Planting Requirements can result in rejection of the Conservation 
Payment. 
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Schedule 2 
Monitoring Requirements, Conditions and Sanctions 
I. The Seller shall: 
1. Make sure that the soil around the tree is kept moist; 
2. This will be monitored by testing the soil moisture in a depth of five centimetres near the rootball. 
 
II. Monitoring Conditions 
1. Monitoring can be done any day within the term of this Agreement; 
2. The Seller can be monitored more than once; 
3. The monitoring will be conducted together by the authorised representatives of the Buyer 
and the representatives of the Kenya Forest Service (KFS). 
 
III. Sanctions: 
1. The Conservation Payment will be reduced by 1% for each tree that was not kept moist on the 
day of the monitoring, according to the following schedule: 
Number of trees with 
soil kept moist 
Conservation Payment in percent 
(including the Base Payment) 
 
30 100 
29 99 
28 98 
27 97 
26 96 
25 95 
24 94 
23 93 
22 92 
21 91 
20 90 
19 89 
18 88 
17 87 
16 86 
15 85 
14 84 
13 83 
12 82 
11 81 
10 80 
9 79 
8 78 
7 77 
6 76 
5 75 
4 74 
3 73 
2 72 
1 71 
0 70 
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Schedule 3 
Seller´s Land 
 
Location:________________________________________________ 
Sub-Location:_____________________________________________ 
Village:__________________________________________________ 
FDA:____________________________________________________ 
 
Land size:______________________________________________Acres 
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Annex 4 
Outcome-Based Tree Planting Research Agreement 
 
Relating to the implementation of land-use change leading to enhanced 
supply of watershed and carbon sequestration services 
 
Between 
ZEF-University of Bonn/ICRAF 
And 
 
Name:_____________________________________________ 
Year of Birth:________________________________________ 
Address/Village:_____________________________________ 
Identification Number_________________________________ 
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This agreement (“this Agreement”) is made on December, 14th 2011 (“Execution of this 
Agreement”). 
between 
(3) ZEF/University of Bonn with registered office at Walter-Flex-Str. 3, 53113 Bonn, Germany, 
and the World Agroforestry Centre – ICRAF with registered office at P.O. Box 30677-00100, 
Nairobi, Kenya (the “Buyers”) 
(4) _________________________________ with identification number ___________________ (the “Seller”) 
Whereas: 
D. The Seller agrees to implement “Tree Planting” as defined below;  
E. The Buyer agrees to make payment to the Seller (“Conservation Payment”) subject to the 
“Monitoring Requirements, Conditions and Sanctions” and “Payment Conditions”; 
F. The Buyer agrees to procure for the Seller the tree seedlings necessary to implement the Tree 
Planting. 
It is agreed as follows: 
1. Definitions 
“Riparian Land” means the land along the river 30 meters from the middle of the river into the 
farm land. 
“Riparian Land Width” means the width of the land along the river. 
2. Payment Conditions 
2.1 90% of the “Conservation Payment” of _____________________ KES will be made by the Buyer 
to the Seller once the Buyer has verified that Tree Planting is implemented and 
maintained in accordance with the “Tree Planting Requirements” and the “Monitoring 
Requirements, Conditions and Sanctions”. 
2.2 The verification of the Conservation Payments will be conducted within one month after 
the Expire Term of this Agreement (i.e. from June, 22nd, 2012 to July, 21st, 2012). 
2.3 10% of the Conservation Payment will be made by the Buyer to the Seller at the day of the 
Execution of this Agreement (i.e. December, 14th, 2011). 
2.4 All Riparian Land subject to Seller’s control or ownership is eligible for implementation of 
Tree Planting under the terms of this Agreement. 
3. Seller’s Warranties 
3.1 The Seller warrants to the Buyer that he owns a Riparian Land at the Kapingazi River or 
its tributaries; 
3.2 The Seller warrants to the Buyer that he owns Riparian Land with a minimum of 12 
meters width along the river. 
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4. Dispute Resolution 
4.1 In the event there is any dispute in respect of the terms of this Agreement between Buyer 
and Seller, this dispute shall be referred to the “Dispute Resolution Committee”, the 
decision of which shall be binding upon both the Buyer and the Seller. 
4.2 The Dispute Resolution Committee consists of representatives of the local administration 
(chiefs and assistance chiefs) and representatives of the Kenya Forest Service (KFS). 
5. Term 
5.1 This Agreement will expire on June, 22nd 2012 (“Expire Term”). 
6. Force Majeure 
6.1 Neither Buyer nor Seller shall be liable for any failure to perform its obligations where 
such failure is as a result of acts of nature (including fire, flood, storm or other natural 
disaster). 
6.2 Either Buyer or Seller asserting acts of nature as an excuse shall have the burden of 
proving that reasonable steps were taken (under the circumstances) to minimise damages 
caused by unexpected events, and that the other party was timely notified of the 
occurrence of the unexpected events. 
 
 
In witness whereof this Agreement has been duly executed.  
 
 
Date: December, 14th, 2011 
 
 
Authorised Buyer Signatories 
Lucie Andeltova 
ZEF-University of Bonn/ICRAF 
 
Authorised Seller Signatories 
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Schedule 1 
Tree Planting Requirements 
I. The Seller shall: 
1. Plant 30 tree seedlings provided by the Buyer on the Riparian Land (i.e. within 30 meters 
from the middle of the river into the farm land) according to the following instructions: 
1.1 The trees shall be planted in rows - minimum of two rows and maximum of eight rows; 
1.2 The minimum distance between the trees shall be three meters; 
1.3 The maximum distance between the rows shall be six meters; 
1.4 The maximum distance of the first row of trees from the middle of the river should be 
five meters; 
1.5 Trees that were at the Riparian Land before this Agreement can be interplanted within 
the rows of the tree seedlings subject to the minimum distance of three meters; 
1.6 The trees shall be planted in rows as shown in the following illustration: 
 
 
2. Compliance on Tree Planting Requirements will be monitored within first month after 
Execution of this Agreement; 
 
II. The Seller shall not: 
1. Replace tree seedlings procured by the Buyer by new seedlings. 
 
III. Sanctions  
1. Any violation of the Tree Planting Requirements can result in rejection of the 
Conservation Payment.  
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Schedule 2 
Monitoring Requirements, Conditions and Sanctions 
I. Monitoring Conditions 
1. Monitoring on the survival rate of the tree seedlings will be conducted after six months from 
the Execution of this Agreement; 
2. The monitoring will be conducted together by the authorised representatives of the Buyer 
and the representatives of the Kenya Forest Service (KFS). 
 
II. Sanctions: 
1. If the survival rate is less than 26 trees then the Conservation Payment will be reduced by 4% 
for each additional tree that did not survive, according to the following schedule: 
Number of trees that 
survived 
Conservation Payment in percent 
(including the Base Payment) 
30 100 
29 100 
28 100 
27 100 
26 100 
25 96 
24 92 
23 88 
22 84 
21 80 
20 76 
19 72 
18 68 
17 64 
16 60 
15 56 
14 52 
13 48 
12 44 
11 40 
10 36 
9 32 
8 28 
7 24 
6 20 
5 16 
4 12 
3 10 
2 10 
1 10 
0 10 
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Schedule 3 
Seller´s Land 
 
Location:________________________________________________ 
Sub-Location:_____________________________________________ 
Village:__________________________________________________ 
FDA:____________________________________________________ 
 
Land size:______________________________________________Acres 
 
 
